自由意志的简要概括

(我的书中出现了这篇文章的改进和更新版本 简要介绍。以下版本仅供保留。)

人脑的某些区域与精神疾病有关
这可能与自由意志有关。资料来源:维基百科。

在我的 上一篇文章,我在自己的形而上学背景下探讨了自由意志的主题: 理想主义的表述。在这篇简短的文章中,我想归纳出我先前讨论所依据的一些原则,以使那些对自由意志这一主题感兴趣但对特定的形而上学公式不一定感兴趣的人受益。

What is freewill? We 所有 有 an intuitive understanding of it, but when we translate that understanding into words, we often misrepresent the 本质 of our own intuition. Having pondered about it for a while, here is how I would define it:

Freewill is the capacity of an agent to 使 an intentional choice unconstrained by any factor outside that which the agent 确定 itself with.

“故意”一词对于区分真实选择和随机选择很重要。真正的选择需要某种偏好,目的或偏见,而不仅仅是掷骰子。

Let's exemplify this definition by taking the agent to 是 a person. Personal freewill is then the capacity of a person to 使 an intentional choice unconstrained by any influence, limit, requirement or power that the person does not identify herself with. Note the emphasis on what a person 确定 herself with, as opposed to what a particular paradigm implies the person to 是 . Materialism, for instance, entails that a person is 我rely her 物理 body. This way, if a person's choices 是 我rely the outcome of 确定性的 物理 processes in her brain, that would still comply with the definition of freewill above. After 所有, the processes in a person's brain 是 part of what the person supposedly is. Yet, most of us would intuitively and immediately reject 确定性的 brain processes to 是 an expression of true freewill. Why? 因为无论出于何种原因,我们都无法将自己与大脑中的过程相结合。 我们说我们 大脑,而不是说我们 一个大脑。

上面的定义还规避了 自由主义者的自由意志, which entails that a truly 自由选择 必须 是 completely non-determined. The problem here is that, from a logical perspective, a choice is either the 确定性的 outcome of some (perhaps unfathomably rich, incomprehensible, transcendent, 我aningful and complex) process, or random. It is very hard, if at 所有 possible, to find semantic or logical space for 自由主义者的自由意志 if we insist on differentiating it form the latter two cases. According to the definition above, on the other hand, true freewill can 是 the expression of a 确定性的 process, so long as the determining factors of that process 是 internal to that which the choosing agent 确定 itself with.

大多数人都以主观经验来识别自己特定的意识和情感。因此,当代理人是人时,只有且仅当 所有 determining factors 是 hind the making of a choice 是 part of the person's conscious thoughts and emotions: her opinions, 是 liefs, 首选项, tastes, likes and dislikes, 目标, etc. The fact that a particular paradigm, like materialism, insists that thoughts and emotions 大脑活动仅仅是一个概念上的抽象,与一个人如何体验自己的身份没有心理上的联系。这样,上面的自由意志的定义就独立于特定的本体论范式,例如唯物主义。

说我们的选择是 确定性的 outcome of processes that we identify ourselves with does not refute the 本质 of our intuition about freewill. The appearance that it does is 我rely a linguistic illusion. Let 我 try to illustrate this with an example. I may say: 'I made choice A but I 可以 有 made choice B.' This statement is a clear assertion of my freewill; in fact, it captures the very core of what freewill entails, doesn't it? Yet, the statement implies that the choice was indeed 决心:由...决定 ! In other words, it was the perceived 本质 of what it 我ans to 我 that 决心 the choice. Therefore, I can rephrase the statement in the following way, without changing its 我aning or implications: 'I chose A 是 cause it is my perceived essential nature to do so, although there were no external factors preventing 我 from choosing B.' Formulated this way, the statement is clearly consistent with the definition above. Do 您 see what I 我an?

当一个人说自己的选择不能由任何事物决定以真正获得自由时,实际上意味着一个人的选择不能由任何事物决定 external to that which one 确定 oneself with。毕竟,除非选择是随机的,否则 必须 是 决心 by something, even if that something is no more than the perceived essential nature of the agent that 使s the choice. True freewill applies in this latter case.

我希望这种简短的表达方式有助于理清一些语言和逻辑上的杂音,这些杂音常常使关于自由意志的讨论蒙上阴影。
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12条评论:

  1. 迈克尔·拉金(Michael Larkin)2014年5月11日,星期日,晚上10:26:00

    嗯一世'm not sure I'我深信,贝尔纳多。你说:

    "Freewill is the capacity of an agent to 使 an intentional choice unconstrained by any factor outside that which the agent 确定 itself with."

    想象一下,我想要一块水果,你的水果碗里盛着苹果和梨。我通常更喜欢梨。如果我事先知道梨是恰到好处的柔软多汁的食物,我'我会选择它。如果没有,我可能会感觉到/闻到或询问您的意见,如果不确定,则可能会选择一个苹果。我可以选择梨子,然后放弃梨子,而取而代之的是苹果,但是我的内部约束并不浪费食物。我想你'd将此作为行使自由意志的一个例子,因为我 '做出有意的选择,不受任何我通常认同的事物之外的事物的束缚,即一个喜欢梨而不是苹果的自我。

    But then I think, what about this preference that I apply my heuristic to in an attempt to satisfy it? Whence comes it, and why do others prefer apples to pears? Do we 有 any real choice? Maybe not. It might seem I 有 自由意志, but it's predetermined by something I 无法控制 i.e. my physiological preference, with which I perforce identify; so I suppose I would still 有 自由意志 under 您r definition. Certainly, no one'强迫我去吃。

    I do actually 是 lieve we 有 the capacity to exercise 自由意志. I'd also agree that we 所有 有 our particular natures that we identify with, and that if nothing or no one stops 我 是 having in accord with mine, then in a way, I am a free agent. But in effect,这可能意味着您可以自由地按照我预定的生理或心理结构行事。For 我, true 自由意志 involves transcending this constitution; 在做 things that it doesn'指示做自动驾驶时(我怀疑大部分时间)时,我们不会't ordinarily do.

    但是,有时情况需要更多的自省。例如,医生可能会建议梨比苹果更容易引起消化不良,而互联网研究可能会证实这一点。然后,选择是否吃梨可能是一个有意识的选择:我'我不仅遵循我的宪法偏好。也许我'我会继续吃,但无论如何,我'实际上,我已经做出了有意识的选择,该做什么,这与您对故意性的规定有关,但似乎与我所认同的分离。我可以't help but identify with my physiological preference for pears, but my 自由选择 consists in deciding whether or not to go with that (predetermined) preference.

    不能使用自动驾驶仪飞行'都是不好的:如果我们为自己采取的每一个小动作而苦恼,我们'd可能做得很少。它'经常面对生存威胁或意识到我们的行为比平时更自觉,而在某些情况下,'d say we really do 有 the opportunity to exercise 自由意志. Having 自由意志 is more than simply 是 ing free of external influences that stop us following our (sometimes hard-wired) preferences.

    想想一个正在考虑是否应征入伍参加当前战争的人。他可能会加入,因为他'是一个有行动的人,或者因为他's not. IMO, it'怀疑这些人正在行使很多(如果有的话)自由意志。 OTOH,一个行动者,会非常仔细地考虑是否应征(例如,因为他愿意'(就像杀人一样),更有可能行使自由意志。同样,对于一个更加被动的人,他会非常谨慎地考虑(因为他可能会感到某种程度的义务捍卫自己的国家)。所以对于第三个人,'我不知道它是对是错,但是在做出决定之前经过三思而行。

    大多数时候,我认为我们只是遵循我们的方式'重组:我们不'甚至到达我们意识到在那里的阶段's an existential choice. We always 有 the capacity to exercise 自由意志, but mostly, don't.

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    1. >> It might seem I 有 自由意志, but it's predetermined by something I 无法控制 i.e. my physiological preference, with which I perforce identify; so I suppose I would still 有 自由意志 under 您r definition. <<

      并不是的。您自己说了:"我的生理偏好,并以此来确定"您被强迫告诉自己与自己认同的事实这一事实清楚地表明,事实上,您没有'不能认同。因此,这是'就我的定义而言,在这里的识别是虚幻的,则为自由意志;它'源自范式的理性结论,而不是自然的,真实的认同。你不做这件事'真正让自己认同的是那件事"无法控制"用你的话。您谈论它的方式恰恰表明您对它的真正缺乏认同。我的定义基于我们对身份的真正主观体验,而不取决于知识模型的含义。

      >>这可能意味着您可以自由地按照我预定的生理或心理结构行事。<<

      在这里你 是 bringing in rational concepts again, theories that may force 您r intellect to adopt a certain identity at a conceptual level. But none of it has to do with 您r natural feeling of self-identification, which is what the definition rests on.

      >> I'我不仅遵循我的宪法偏好<<

      According to the paradigm, 您 certainly still 是. But then again, that's not what I 我ant with identification. I 我ant 您r true, concept-free, feeling-toned experience of self-identification.

      >> I can't help but identify with my physiological preference for pears, but my 自由选择 consists in deciding whether or not to go with that (predetermined) preference. <<

      在这里你'重新混合起来。要么(a)您采用一种理性的思维范式,该思维范式规定了不'你真实的感觉自我认同;或(b)您独立于任何理论或概念化认识到自己真正认同的事物。如果您选择(a),那么您的'free choice'当然,它仍然源自您的生理,只是来自生理的不同部分(而不是味觉,而是合理化)。整个事情应该是预先确定的,而您做出与您的生理状况无关的选择的印象应该只是一种幻想。现在,如果您选择(b),那么关于生理学等的整个概念库就不再重要了。问题不在于您的智力相信自己是什么,而是您在体验的直觉层面上认同自己的东西。

      >> 大多数时候,我认为我们只是遵循我们的方式're constituted <<

      您在这里暗示的二元论-即'you' and the 'way 您 是 constituted' -- colours 您r entire post. I understand it, but it's entirely conceptual. Notice that it is derived from a certain intellectual schema that is not required or entailed by my definition of freewill. Conceptualisations aside, there is something 您 truly identify with -- the 'you'在上面的引用中。如果做出的选择没有外部限制'you,'那我称之为自由意志也就是说,当然'you'具有决定其选择的内在本质。

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    2. 迈克尔·拉金(Michael Larkin)2014年5月14日,星期三,6:40:00

      Thanks for the reply, Bernardo. I guess that 您r use of the word "identifies" is what led 我 to misunderstand 您, and to judge (evidently mistakenly) that 您 您rself were using dualistic language, to which I responded in similar terms (I know from what 您've written in the past that 您 sometimes consciously use dualistic language for convenience).

      I 是 lieve that what most people for most of the time identify with is 自我, which one 可以 describe as a composite of physiology and psychology--if one were using rather dualistic language, as I was. But to 是 more nuanced, if there'是一种二元论,我认为它介于两种精神状态之间。

      IMO, 自我ic 我ntation renders us virtually incapable of exercising 自由意志 and causes us to fly on autopilot; during more reflective moments, we may 是 able to override that to some degree. The "we" 在做 the overriding is closer to essential mode: is identifying more with the true 本质 of what we 是.

      我觉得我们可以't否认两种指导方式;能够'不要否认有时我们比另一个更受制于人。或者,有时候,自我指导可能会非常有用。而且,我认为可能需要很长时间才能意识到两种模式的存在:就我而言,这大约是44年。那'并不是说在那之前,我还没有'从来没有进入过基本模式:在此之前,我还没有 '尽管知道这些字眼,但确实掌握了区别"ego" and "essence" for many years.

      诀窍是自发地体验了基本的指导模式,而我一直无法确定其原因。它只是开始一天,持续了几个星期,给人留下了不可磨灭的印象。有时,它会重新出现(通常较短)。在其缺席期间,人们会对它充满信心并尝试采取相应的行动。在它存在期间,不需要信仰:它'很轻松,也很光荣。

      苏菲派指的是"完美的人"(insan-i-kamil)无法执行除"will of God". Now I'我没有声称自己是insan-i-kamil:距离很远。但是也许-也许-我've隐约瞥见了苏非派的话。

      如果它's true, then in a way there is no such thing as 自由意志: rather, there'在一种指导模式中,我们可以通过机器人进行操作,而在另一种指导中,我们可以'这只能帮助我们,但要符合我们的真实本性(并且可能会在不同程度上做到这一点)。因为我们'保留所有旧牌上的筹码,这意味着我们的鞋子会像旧版一样动作,我相信实际上是这样。

      换句话说,也许是'是The Stream中的水,从一个有限的角度来看,正在漩涡中体验自己,有时还可以更接近The Stream的角度。据报道,Insan-i-kamil与上帝之间没有任何区别:人身死亡时没有过渡。为此,许多人因亵渎罪而被残酷处决:也许最著名的是Mansur Al-Hallaj。

      我怀疑我们可能在最底层达成了一致,并对我的误解表示歉意。

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  2. 出色的清晰度。但是,有一个更大的自由:自由是由于没有意识到,没有情感或以任何其他方式自我识别任何外观而产生的,这是由于直接认识到所有外观都没有内在存在而没有自。

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    1. 我同意...但这是只能经历的事情,不能进行分析论证。

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  3. 我发现以自由意志为尺度,超越二元论的缺点是有用的。自由意志可能与代理商实现(理解)能力的比例成正比'自身的条件性以及克服或超越所述条件性的能力。

    还值得考虑的是,我们的心理部分(大约50%)由社会,文化,自然等构成。所以说这种有组织的星尘构造。

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  4. 以下是我的几条思路'一直试图按照这些思路加入在一起,但是避风港'还没到那儿。欢迎输入。

    1.也许我们可以这样处理:

    我们做出的选择和走的道路来自我们的偏好。这否定了"free 将"从某种意义上说,我们所做的选择与我们是谁(我们认同的人)相对应,所以通常我们不't so much "make"这些选择随着经历的发生而变化。我们想像一下事实,我们 可以 选择了其他方式,但我们从未这样做。

    但是,还有另一个"free 将"这是因为我们是"first cause"我们自己。我们可以自由地"change our shape"因此,我们的性格。这不涉及 在做;它是一个 变得. If we change what we 是, we change decisions 将 arise from us subsequently. And surely 所有 we really want is to 使 decisions consistent with who we 是 and with our desires?

    2.进一步的想法:

    我们不't directly control ourselves in general, upon examination. 我们不'尽管我们可以短暂地直接进行干预,但仍可以时刻控制着我们的身体或其他思想。也许我们的"free 将"更好的特征是:注入新的"goals"使我们的行为方向开始与该新目标保持一致;和"free won't"压制某些东西's starting to happen. Is true 自由意志 really about "target setting"偶尔抑制自发行为?这个"target setting"等同于"改变我们的性格" above.

    "Decision making", then, can 是 either an experience that happens to us, or the experience of taking a grip of ourselves and directly manipulating our character. It is possible to live 您r life confusing the first one with the second - i.e. to live 'automatically' according to 您r character as it was from year 'x'起,永远不知道。

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    1. 1:我们在什么基础上'decide" to change ourselves? Based on what 您 call our 'preferences,'反映了我们现在的状况。因此,我们成为现在的事物的直接功能。没有? :)但是我不'认为这会否定自由意志,因为正如我在上文中所定义的那样,自由意志是我们认同自我的反映。

      2:从某种意义上说,这只是在推迟问题。根据什么我们决定'new 目标'? If the 'new 目标' 是 chosen as a function of what we 是 now, then 您 有 the same problem. We still act as a function of what we 是. If we happen to identify with the totality of what we 是 now, then the setting of new 目标 is a freewilled choice. If we don't identify with that totality, then we feel that a choice is 是 ing imposed on us (even the choice of new 目标).

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    2. 啊,我只是发现了这个回复。是。

      反思时,差异被我们所认同的东西所包容-较大的自我或较小的,以思想为中心的自我(自我)。我们第一次如何从一种模式切换到另一种模式是一个谜。在那之后,小自我有了'knowledge' of the fact of a larger self, albeit only conceptual 知识, and we can then perhaps 'will'上下文的变化('成为我们经验积累的空间'),并可以自由选择目标设定。

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  5. This is a really old post of 您rs Bernardo, but since I 有 recently found out about 您 and 您r (wonderful might I add) books and content (I'm already reading The Idea of The World - this is genuinely what modern science and philosophy needs right now btw), please forgive 我 for 是 ing so late to the discussion :) hopefully 您 do still get notifications if comments arise on these posts.

    I 有 contemplated about free-will a lot in my last decade of 我ditative, introspective and spiritual practices. I do feel that in a way I agree with 您, yet in other ways our positions may differ (it 可以 是 that we 我an the same things, yet it has simply 是 en lost in language). Though some of what I write is from an intellectual and philosophical standpoint, I try to stay experientially grounded in my thesis.

    在我看来,您假设为“意识/思维​​”(您的本体论原语)的“单一现实”,“绝对”已分裂为变体(在神学中可以称为灵魂),例如被称为“原始单子”。整体上具有一定的意志力(涵盖了大部分宇宙的基于非改变的思想境界),但对于其中的每个改变(灵魂/单子),也完全可以利用该意志力。 *在这里,我相信您认为所有人都没有自己的意志,只有改变才有意志-这可能会引起争议,您肯定是正确的,但是我赢了't go into this here.

    因此,人们可以说,每一个改变/灵魂都有一种基本的自由意志,不受任何形式的认同的束缚,但是只有从对自己作为纯意识的认同中(但仍然作为一种纯粹意识的改变而存在,从而将自己作为一个个体来体验)的一切,但理解它也是整个事情的一部分)。按照深奥的思想,宇宙博弈中的变化经历了一种内卷化,在这种变化中,它以越来越多的思维构造来识别自己……一直到最密集的思维和看似坚固的思维构造,这些构成了"physical"我们所知道的现实。之后,它进入"evolution"并对其先前迷失的事物进行身份识别。

    改变的最局限性识别是基于较低水平的思维构造(恐惧,愤怒,缺乏...)的身体和完全有限的精神自我,而除此之外,还有越来越多的细微识别(通常被称为(如微妙的物体,星体和因果体),并一路完成对所有这些构造的身份识别,并将其作为绝对的纯粹方面存在。现在,根据我的经验,即使当一个人与“绝对”(本体论原语)合并时,它仍然保留着一种个体化的改变的感觉,但随之而来的是,它也涵盖了整个事物。从这个角度看,它是最无限和最自由的,因为它并没有真正与意识中所创造的思想境界相呼应。我认为,这就是所谓的真正的未定自由意志。

    .....继续回复.....

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  6. ......继续先前的评论................

    在我的 experience I would posit that every alter/soul has, to a degree, a sense of 是 ing fundamentally consciousness. Without at least a subtle awareness of this, they would not 是 able to exist. The more one explores and practices spirituality, the more their self expands and the less they limit themselves with various identifications which may 是 determining factors. 在我的 experience more consciousness and awareness always causes more and more dis-identification from the various forms of the mind created thought-scape (forms of subtle and gross creation - 所有 the way to the 物理) and thus an increased sense of peace, love (which is a fundamental realization of this unity) and freedom.
    人越有意识,从某种意义上说,它们受任何形式的认同(无论是思想还是身体)(显然是密集形式的思想)的限制或决定,就越少。从这一点开始,从这种自由和意识开始,完全的不确定性,完全的自由,无限的创造力和自发性滴入了仍然被人们认可的改变者心理的较低层次,并通过这种认同而扭曲了自己。

    Thus, the more one is free and not identified with anything except Freedom itself, the more their 将 is completely non-determined. The determining factors come from the more and more dense and complex 我ntal creations, 所有 the way to the 物理. The more the alter/soul/monad 确定 with the densest and most immutable parts of creation (the 物理), the less actual free-will they 有 and the more they 是 决心. Thus those that 是 completely identified with 是 ing 物理 bodies 是 far more 决心 by the thought-creations encompassing them, than those that 是 identified with less and less, as well as more subtle forms of mind - or indeed nothing at 所有.



    总结:所有真正的自由和完全不确定的(自由主义者)自由意志都来自绝对或意识。它通过改变/灵魂的思想流淌下来's identifications and distorts itself through them. The more one is identified with the varying thought-creations of this 我ntal world, the more one is 决心, the 物理 world 是 ing the densest and most predetermined. The more one can let go of 所有 identifications, the more one 是 comes completely non-determined by anything, as they 是 come Freedom itself.

    希望这是连贯的,并能很好地解释:)我将许多这些经验作为我个人经验,观察和内省的基础-以及各种形式的深奥和精神文学作品,这些使我的观点更加鲜明。您的书也是令人赞叹的观点,我期待继续阅读并推荐给所有我喜欢的人:)

    充满爱心和最良好的祝愿,

    杰克

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