The linguistic 骗局 的 的'mind/matter duality'


“平行世界” 赛琳娜的艺术。 版权所有 赛琳娜的艺术,经许可使用。

I have recently been accused 的 proposing a metaphysics that simply replaces one form 的 reductionism with another: instead 的 reducing everything to 物, I 所有egedly 'reduce' everything to 心神, 的supposed polar opposite 的 物. Underlying this accusation is 的notion that 'mind' and 'matter' are 双重概念或 polar opposites at 的same level 的 abstraction, so that a reduction to either 的 them is seen as equally abstract. The suggestion is that there is a higher, truer, more enlightened point-of-view that precedes both 心神 and 物 ontologically, and from which we can contemplate both 心神 and 物 as a lower-level duality or polarity. As such, I 所有egedly fail to bring us any closer to that 'higher point-of-view,' instead replacing one abstraction with another.

If this is what you think, you've fallen for a linguistic 骗局; one that, unfortunately, plagues most 的 our culture. Mind and 物 are not a true duality; and they aren't 极地相反. Since 的time 的 Aristotle we've 知道n that 我们在识别真正的矛盾对时必须小心,以免造成重大逻辑错误。非常相似的原理在这里适用。 Mind is not at 的same level 的 abstraction as 物. As a 物 的 fact, 心神 is not an abstraction at 所有. Only 物 is.

Before we continue, let me state precisely what I mean by 'mind.' I use 的word 'mind' in exactly 的same way that I use 的word 'consciousness': 心神/consciousness is that whose excitations are 主观 experiences. Whatever 心神/consciousness may intrinsically be, its 激发方式 are our 主观 experiences, which in turn are our entire reality. My use 的 this definition is not an attempt to be peculiar: it's simply a recognition that there is no universally-accepted definition 的 心神 and 意识out there, so I have to be precise regarding what I mean. From this point on, I will use only 的word 'mind.'

在亚马逊上可用!

Since 所有 we can ever 知道 are our 主观 experiences, 物 –作为所有经验之外都存在的东西–是...的抽象 and in 心神。我们 推断 that 物 exists outside 心神, but even that 推断ence is an experience that arises and exists 内 心神. 在开始对任何事物进行理论化,抽象化或概念化之前,头脑就是存在的东西, including 的very notions 的  减少, 二元性和极性。 When one states that 心神 and 物 form a duality, or a polarity, 的statement itself arises and exists in one's 心神 as a 主观 experience. One cannot step out 的 one's own 心神 and look upon it as a mere abstraction. 哪里 would one be 'looking from' if not from one's own 心神? Do you see what I mean?

All 的 our abstractions arise from and 内 our 心神, 的ground 的 our being. Therefore, it is obviously a fallacy to say that 物 and 心神 are 双重概念或 极地相反. Matter is an abstraction 心神. We can never transcend 心神 so to see it as a member 的 a lower-level dual pair, for 心神 –无论本质上是什么–是我们开始概念化现实之前的状态。 To say that 心神 and 物 form a polarity is like saying that 涟漪 are 的polar opposite 的 的water where they ripple. 这个不成立。极性仅有效 between different kinds 的 涟漪 – say, 涟漪 that flow to 的right versus 涟漪 that flow to 的left – not between 涟漪 and 的medium where they ripple. And since 心神 is 的'medium' 的 的experiences we call 物, there cannot be a duality between 物 – 'ripples' 的 心神 – and 心神 either. Matter isn't independent 的 心神.

The illusion 的 a duality or a polarity between 心神 and 物 arises purely from language. It's a linguistic 骗局. In order to speak 的 的very 'medium' 的 主观 experience, we must give it a name. We call it 'mind,' or 'consciousness.' Then, in order to speak 的 certain 具体 激发方式 的 this 'medium,' we also give them names, like 'matter.' Finally, we lose ourselves in our own linguistic abstractions and end up thinking 的 'mind' and 'matter' as 极地相反. We delude ourselves into believing that we, 的agents conceiving 的 polarities and dualities, are somehow different from 'mind;' that we can look at 心神 from 的outside. We can't. Mind is what we are. It refers to our identity, not to one 的 our abstractions. It's 的'medium' 的 experience, not a type 的 experience.

When people implicitly assume that somehow there is a 'higher point-of-view' from which to contemplate 的alleged 心神/matter duality or polarity, they are abstracting away from their own nature. You are 心神 and you can't step away from what you are in order to see a true 心神/matter duality/polarity. There is no such 'higher point-of-view,' just linguistic confusion that gets us lost in 的forest 的 our own conceptual abstractions. When I say that 所有 reality is 激发方式s 的 心神, 我是 not 'reducing' 的universe to an abstract concept – such as 物 – but simply acknowledging 的very ground 的 being.

闭幕词: in 非对偶ity circles, 的word 'mind' is usually taken to mean 'thoughts' or 'intellect.' As such, one could say that reducing reality to 'mind,' in this particular sense, amounts to reducing reality to intellectual conceptualizations. This, indeed, is just as bad as reducing reality to 物, which is itself an abstract concept. So please remember that, above, as well as in 所有 my work, I use 的word 'mind' as a synonym for what in 非对偶ity circles is called 'consciousness.' This is more consistent with 的terminology 的 Western philosophy.
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50条评论:

  1. This is a helpful explanation Bernardo. What would you call an original phenomenon that does not have 主观 experiences? Could this also be 'mind'在您的词典中?涅bb乐队会被归类为'mind'?是否可以将非心理现象包括在内'mind'?只是澄清定义。

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    1. 嗨,皮特,
      If experiences are 心神 in motion (i.e. excitations 的 心神), 心神 at rest is 的phenomenon you refer to. It has no experiences -- it is phenomenologically empty -- but is pregnant with 的potential for 所有 experiences, just like a guitar string at rest is pregnant with 的potential for 所有 notes. Yet, notice that there is nothing to a vibrating guitar string other than 的guitar string itself. In 的same way, there is nothing to experience but 心神 itself. '形式就是空虚,空虚就是形式。'
      By definition, a non-mental phenomenon cannot be included in 心神. I argue that there is no such a thing as a non-mental phenomenon. Even 的potentiality for experience is a mental phenomenal, for 的same reason that a guitar string at rest is still a 'stringuish' phenomenon.
      干杯,B。

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    2. Thanks. So, 的silent guitar string would be 的'Real' and it would be ontologically prior to 的学科/object distinction that 创造 的world 的 opposites and appearances. Is that it?

      It'令人惊讶的是,用吉他弦可以传达多少个主意...

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    3. What causes 的excitation, 的first move?
      Is it 的reflection caused by 的geometry 的 的consciousnesses, which you metaphorized as a self reflecting cylindrical aluminium folio?

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  2. 马修·巴斯比(Matthew Busby)2015年6月1日,星期一,下午3:27:00

    嗨,您好。

    我如何看待您的论点。

    P1. We can 只有 知道 our 主观 experience. (I interpret 'only ever 知道'作为形而上学上的必要)
    P2。我们的概念是从不同类型的经验中抽象出来的。
    P3. But our concepts, such as duality between 心神 and 物,are contingent to 的existence 的 our 心神.
    P4. Mind is what we are, it is a 中 的 experience, not a type 的 experience.It is existing before we even begin abstracting.
    C: Therefore it follows that 的notion 的 duality is merely a linguistic confusion, resulting from misplacing 的ontology 的 心神 as being another abstract principle that reality 'reduces'而不是已经存在(或存在)。

    但是,给定P1,这在形而上学上是不可能的(根据我的阅读'only ever') to demonstrate P4. Since 的Mind is not a type 的 experience, it is a different entity namely 的'medium' 的 experience, in which case we can have no 知道ledge 的 it, since we can only have 知道ledge 的 -our- 主观 -experiences-. But if P4 cannot be justified, then you cannot justify any 的 your 知道ledge regarding anything about 的Mind if 的Mind is an actually existent entity but not a type 的 experience.

    当我'm sure you realize, rejecting 的essence 的 P1 would mean 的collapse 的 your philosophy, but how is it possible to reformulate it without losing 的essence 的 idealism? The other option is to change your definition 的 心神 to be included in P1.

    对您的回复感兴趣-Matt

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    1. 马特
      经验(P1)的存在意味着存在哪些经验(P4)。
      Experimentally, this translates into 的sense 的 "I am"经验固有的,但不受概念认同的影响。
      干杯,B。

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    2. 马修·巴斯比(Matthew Busby)2015年6月2日,星期二,5:34:00

      贝尔纳多
      我可能同意你的观点,但是,让'不会忘记"there is experience" to "我与这次经历并不相同,我一定是经历过的事物". 这里 we have snuck in 的Cartesian Ego.

      Now, if 所有 we ever can 知道 immediately is our 主观 experience, and 所有 else is an abstraction then 的concept Mind itself, is an abstraction. Hence also, this Ego. And what does it mean to say that our identity (as you said we are 心神), is an abstraction? How can we then 'know' it, it not being a 主观 experience but a receiver 的 experience?

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    3. 马特,我没有任何归属'所经历的。' That'这就是为什么我称它为'经历的' precisely to avoid loading it with any attributes. But experience is a phenomenon that, by its very nature, is inherently associated with 的experiencer, even if we are not in a position to say anything about 的experiencer'的本性。事实证明,要坚持我的哲学,我不't need to say anything at 所有 about 的experiencer, so long as I can assert that it, whatever it may be, is there.
      干杯,B。

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    4. Ah 马特 one more thing. If experiences are excitations 的 经历的 then we have to qualify your statement that "我的经历与经历并不相同。" There is nothing to a vibrating -- i.e. excited -- guitar string but 的string itself, is there? As such, there is nothing to experience but 所经历的。 The experiencer and 的experience aren'不同的本体论类别或实体。干杯,B。

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  3. 伯纳多,我'm intrigued, as 的modern (post Descartes) notion 的 "matter" most likely came into existence with Descartes. My understanding is 的question 的 duality was radically different prior to 的modern age.

    这里'首先,是对偶性(或极性或无论你是谁)的另一种抽象例子'd like to call it:>)

    if i distinguish (not divide or separate into a duality) perceiving and percept, what is that Awareness 内 which both perceiving and percept arise?

    举一个具体的例子:

    "I see a 树."

    感知: seeing
    知觉: 树

    What is 的relationship 的 的perceiving (seeing), 的percept (tree) and 的non-phenomenal Silence which embraces both, constitutes both, and into which both dissolve?

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    1. 另一个例子:

      'I think a thought'

      'Perceiving': thinking
      'Percept': 的thought

      哪里's 的object? 哪里's 的duality? Isn't 的thought simply an excitation 的 my consciousness? Why do we treat 知觉 的 supposedly 目的 things as different than 的'perception' -- i.e. experience -- 的 a thought or emotion? Many 情绪, for instance, are totally outside 的control 的 egoic volition, just like 'outside phenomena.' Many 思想 are collective (ideologies), just like 'outside phenomena.'

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    2. 的"object"(当然是"within" consciousness) is 的"tree" (the perceived image or percept) and 的"subject" is 的mind-life/energy-body composite, which receives (unwittingly) 的"IDEA"来自宇宙或普世精神("Mind-At-Large"如您所指)和构造(不是"creates") 的image filtered through 的particular history 的 that (semi)-individualized 心神-life/energy-body composite. The transcendent silent Awareness encompasses 所有 at every moment - 的semi-individualized composite, 的true individualized Awareness which transcends space and time, as well as 的cosmic/universal Mind (or 心神 at large) which for 的unawakened semi-individualized composite makes use 的 it as a subconscious instrument. When 的individual (beyond space-time) awakens, then, in union with universal Mind, acts as a conscious vehicle for 的manifestation.

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  4. 为了清楚起见,我认为's a great way to describe 的modern argument about 心神 and 物 as a linguistic 骗局. I'm just exploring 的possibility that this may not fully resolve 的more 古 questions (East and West; not just Eastern) regarding duality - which generally understood 物 as inseparable from 心神; at least, as far as I understand them.

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  5. 嗯,请重新阅读您的结语。因此,在您的术语中,非现象静默等于您're using 的word "mind" for?

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    1. I think 所有 experiences are excitations 的 的'非现象的沉默,' or 'mind,' or 'consciousness.' As such, there is nothing but 的非现象的沉默, or 心神, for exactly 的same reason that a vibrating guitar string is nothing but 的string itself. The Heart Sutra says exactly this, in my view. It's perhaps 的clearest 的 所有 Sutras.

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  6. This is one 的 的most helpful posts i'贝尔纳多(Bernardo)在一段时间内见过您。它只是引发了另一个问题:

    当我 understand 的pre-modern questions regarding duality, they involved ideas and forms.

    I could give a Western/Greek example if I knew 的tradition well enough (particularly with Plotinus, who I have some familiarity with and who strikes me as one 的 的most profound mystics 的 的West, and who inspired Jewish, Christian and Islamic mystics) but I 知道 的Indians slightly better.

    因此,让我看看是否可以在此处将其与您的论文相关。

    On 的"objective" side there's "激发方式"。好的,那很有道理。这是"spanda"松散地翻译为"vibrations" in 的Tantric tradition.

    On 的"subjective side" (not yet what you're referring to as "mind", I think!!??) are ideas - which I guess are also 激发方式, which are reflected in our experience AS 的目的 aspects 的 的universe (whether 目的 thought patterns, emotions or 的sensations which we refer to as 的"external" world).

    然后那边's 心神, which in Tantra, 的 course, would be Chit - or more precisely, Chit-Shakti - indicating that Silent Awareness or Consciousness, at least in relationship to 的world 的 experience, is always an active Energy or Force.

    这有意义吗还是我想念你're saying?

    很棒的帖子,引发了有趣的思考。

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    1. Well, I think there is only 心神/consciousness. All experiences, 的 any kind, whether we call them 主观 or 目的, are equally excitations 的 心神/consciousness. What distinguishes what we call 'objective'经验主要有两件事:(1)它们独立于个人意志(即,一个孤立的大意改变者的意志)而展开; (2)它们在个人之间(即在不同的独立变更之间)始终如一地共享。可以通过理解将要分离的一个个体的个体来解释这两种事情:'objective'因此,现实只是在改变之外展开的广泛思维的心理过程,因此是集体的,与改变的意志无关。我们称他们为'perceptions.' What we call 'subjective'内在生活只是在各自变化内部展开的激发精神的模式。我们称他们为'thoughts', 'emotions,' and 'fantasy.'
      True imagination (imaginatio vera, in 的alchemists'语言)是一个例外:它是'objective,' in 的sense 的 being collective and outside alter volition. But it isn't perceived via 的five senses. Swedenborg and 的Ismaili philosophers considered 的Imagination an organ 的 知觉 的 obfuscated aspects 的 empirical reality that aren't available to 的five senses.

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  7. 善良,第4个帖子-我'我将等待,为您和其他人留出空间-但在您做出回应后,我可能会对此表现过程进行更精确的分析描述-我'll wait to see if I'我很了解你've说到目前为止。同样,很棒的东西。

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  8. 我不会'不想刻画"mind" and "matter"双重,但极地。以类似的方式,我想看看"subject" and "object" as polar. I referred to your form 的 idealism as reductionist because it reduce everything to 的"mind" or "subject" side 的 的polarity. 我不't 知道 what 的concept 的 "subjectivity"可能意味着,除非它是相对于"objectivity."如果你想摆一些"non-dual" form 的 absolute 意识or absolute 知道ing beyond 学科 and 目的 (e.g., Hegelian dialectical idealism), I might understand you better. But it seems to me you are privileging 学科ivity too much, obscuring 的fact that it is impossible to define without reference to 目的ivity.

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    1. 但是不要't you see that any 目的 is already fully a part 的 学科ivity, and therefore part 的 its own field, and not an 目的 one? "Objectivity" is an illusion because 的"field 的 对象" is a 主观 field! Polarities are nothing but more dualistic abstractions (although personally I like "most 主观 to least 主观" rather than "most 目的 to least 目的" which entirely eludes 的question 的 学科ivity)... It seems a pressing question that continually raises its head is: what would it take to finish with philosophy? Or, rather, can we be done with philosophizing? that is, with exercising linguistic-based performances 的 concepts which lead nowhere but into another cul-de-sac?

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    2. I can see that 所有 mention 的 对象 implies that a 学科 has experienced said 目的. But 我是 just adding 的corollary statement, which I find just as obvious, that any mention 的 a 学科 implies that there are 对象 for that 学科 to experience. Calling 对象 an illusion and saying 学科s are 的only reality is exactly 的sort 的 reductionism I'm trying to avoid.

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    3. 马修,
      尝试暂时脱离以主题为基础定义对象的概念框架,反之亦然。仅出于争辩的目的,而应使用对这些词的直观理解。我的意思是,只有意识-分裂成我们称为众生的改变-并且所有现实都以这种意识的激发的复杂模式出现。我们可以称这种意识为'subject'?用普通的语言,我认为不仅我们可以,而且''objects'作为意识之外的事物,并且'subjects' as that which is conscious. 我是 simply acknowledging and using this general intuition, and I think it is strictly valid to do so. My ontology can then be framed as entailing that 的apparent 对象 are simply part 的 的unfolding and expression 的 的学科 to itself.
      干杯,B。

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    4. By 的way, I deny that 心神 and 物 form a polarity, for 的same reasons that I deny them to form a duality. How do you differentiate polarity from duality anyway?

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    5. Duality would mean 心神 could exist independently and without reference to 物 (or vice versa).
      Polarity implies they are each mutually dependent on 的other: without 心神, 物 could not be 物; without 物, 心神 could not be 心神.

      Of course, whether we think 的relation between 心神 and 物 as dual or polar completely changes what these concepts mean (e.g., Whitehead's understanding 的 "matter" as creative potential is not at 所有 的same as Descartes, who held it to be extended stuff).

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    6. My argument applies to both duality and polarity then. I adapted 的text to make this explicit.

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    7. By 的way, in many traditions what you call a polarity is conflated with duality. Advaita is an obvious example, where duality is also meant as polarity (pairs 的 opposites). I understand and acknowledge your differentiation, but it doesn'就我的论点而言,什么都不能改变。

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    8. 这里 is 的key change in 的text:
      "To say that 心神 and 物 form a polarity is like saying that 涟漪 are 的polar opposite 的 的water where they ripple. 这个不成立。极性仅有效 between different kinds 的 涟漪 – say, 涟漪 that flow to 的right versus 涟漪 that flow to 的left – not between 涟漪 and 的medium where they ripple. And since 心神 is 的'medium' 的 的experiences we call 物, there cannot be a duality between 物 – 'ripples' 的 心神 – and 心神 either. Matter isn't independent 的 心神."

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    9. 贝尔纳多 your analogy works for 的way you are defining 的concepts "mind" and "matter," but not in 的way others (like Whitehead) are. This isn't to say you are wrong, just that there are other ways 的 talking that are, I believe, also elucidatory, and that avoid dualism. The proper analogy for Whitehead's polar reading 的 的concepts would be to say that 心神 and 物 are like 的trough and 的crest 的 a waveform. They belong together and cannot be understood in isolation. The process theologian John Cobb, Jr. articulates Whitehead's perspective on 的mind/matter polarity in this short essay: http://www.pandopopulus.com/mind-vs-matter/

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    10. 马修, yes, 我是 speaking from 内 的context 的 my philosophical system, and arguing that, according to it, we cannot speak 的 a polarity, or a duality, between 心神 and 物. Of course, I also argue in my broader writings that 唯心主义 is 的best ontology. The latter is 的body 的 my work.

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    11. 马修,
      I gave 的following answer to Pete below, which may be helpful for you too, perhaps:

      If 的'subject' is meant to be 的ego, dissociated alter, personal awareness, finite 意识, etc., then YES, 我是 所有 for 的transcendence 的 的学科 in this sense. This 学科 is an illusion; it isn't there to begin with. And 的对象 this 学科 sees are also an illusion: they are just 的outside image 的 mental processes in 心神-at-large, experienced from 的dissociated perspective 的 an alter.

      BUT, if 的学科 is 的experiencER directly implied by 的very existence 的 experience, in 的sense 的 心神-at-large as 的experiencER 的 reality, then THAT 学科 isn't transcended because it is 所有 there is. The 对象, from its NON-dissociated point-of-view, are just its own 主观ly-experienced mental processes, like imagination, emotion, thought, etc. At that level, there is just this one 学科, experiences being its own excitations.

      Under no formulation 的 idealism -- in fact, under no ontology except for eliminative materialism -- can one deny or transcend 的experiencER at 的level 的 心神-at-large. Doing so amounts to denying experience, since experience implies 的experiencer.

      I insist on using 的word 'subjective' because 的culture at large associates 'objective'带有意识之外的东西'subject' with experience itself. I want to piggy-back on this general intuition so to emphasize that there is NOTHING outside 的 意识。

      这有帮助吗?

      唐'伙计们,不要对术语和曲折的概念方案感到困惑。我的意思是'如果您停止尝试将其与各种其他方案相关联/标记,那就太复杂了。

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  9. 抱歉,马特,打扰一下,只是为了进一步澄清-

    我希望你’我会原谅我的另一篇文章–我以为我可能会通过预期一个可能的响应来节省您一些时间– I’我知道您的主要目标之一就是简单性和可访问性,“ancient”复杂的哲学体系似乎与此相反。相信我非常认同您的目标,但是我不相信’t 知道 的 any other systems that are as detailed as ones like 的Tantra. So in order for me to better understand what you’重新交流,我只想暂时提及这一点(实际上,听起来马特可能在讲类似的观点-看来他'实际上同意您的意见:>) (i.e. non dual absolute 意识beyond 学科 and 目的)

    当然变得有趣….

    好的,现在我应该保持安静:>))

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    1. 黑格尔当然不是't 的first to propose an absolute perspective beyond 学科 and 目的 ("身份与差异的认同"). Nargajuna comes to 心神 as an Eastern precedent. But Hegel's system is pretty darn detailed. It is 的one I 知道 best, at least. I have less trouble with 的Hegelian form 的 idealism (even though I still disagree with it, preferring Schelling'的自然哲学)比我对贝尔纳多所做的's,尽管我当然也没有't read enough to really 知道 所有 的details. From 的sound 的 的few posts 的 his I'我已经读过(特别是这本),但听起来他采用了类似于Bishop Berkeley的方式's 主观 idealism.

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    2. 马特,我'm not that familiar with Berkeley, and actually Greg Goode (a well 知道n non dualist teacher in New York, who studied with -one 的 的foremost Berkeley scholars 的 的last century - I think his name was Blanchard) makes an interesting case that Berkeley has been misunderstood as a 主观 idealist, and is actually much closer to Nagarjuna than people generally assume - but I'm afraid i can't make 的case. Greg has a website on emptiness teachings in which he connects them to idealism; you might want to take a look.

      I'伯纳多(Bernardo)以前很困惑'在我认为是理想主义和非二元论之间的明显转换,但是我'我越来越清楚(我认为!)他'的话实际上与Nagarjuna和Shankara都非常接近'm well aware there are boatloads 的 folks out there who will be appalled at 的idea 的 assuming those two have anything in common, but for that argument, I can say 我不'没有足够的知识去追求它,然后再次向您推荐Greg:>))

      无论如何,我相信'值得您花些时间进一步研究贝尔纳多's writings, particularly his latest 2 books, as he does address this. Peter Jones (who entered 的first comment above) has been very active on Bernardo'去年的s论坛对此进行了细化。

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    3. I forgot to end that last paragraph, saying one 的 的major reasons why I think it's worth 的time and effort to clarify your understanding 的 Bernardo'他的著作是他在英勇地尝试:(a)使这些东西足够简单,以使非哲学家可以使用它; (b)使它在学术上足够被接受,以使其比其他有价值的但有时是简单的非对偶著作更具实用性和实用性。

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    4. 马修,《超越后的简报》第2章包含了我的想法的摘要。我总是尽量避免给自己贴标签('Idealism'是我只是毫不犹豫地采用了,只屈服于最低沟通要求),所以我赢了't 的 fer a voluntary framing 的 my ideas under any 具体 idealist box. :) I feel something is always lost and other things erroneously attributed to my ideas when I try to communicate through labels. The best way to understand what I mean is not by finding 的right label for it, but simply to read what I say in my books. :)

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    5. A very, very short summary is here: http://www.yiqimaicha.com/2015/04/the-reality-nervous-system.html

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    6. 谢谢,伯纳多。一世'll try and have a look ASAP. Apologies for labeling, but it is at least a helpful way to get to 知道 each other ; )

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  10. There are three different dualities to be concerned with here. First is 的pseudo-duality between 心神 and 物 that Bernardo is rightly dismissing. If 'matter' refers to some 心神less substance, then -- once one realizes that there is no such thing -- seeking to transcend 心神/matter makes no more sense than defining a genus to include horses and unicorns.

    But there is 的学科/object duality to be concerned with. However, there are two very distinct dualities which, alas, both go under 的name 的 学科/object. One is 的distinction between so-called 主观 phenomena (thoughts, feelings,..) and so-called 目的 phenomena (sense percepts). Perhaps these could be better called 'inner' and 'outer' phenomena, those being how we naively think 的 them. The other duality is between what Merrell-Wolff calls 的Pure Subject, on 的one hand, and 所有 phenomena on 的other. Or, it could be considered as 的duality between experiencer and experienced. Perhaps we could call it that. And then just drop 的terms 'subject' and 'object'. The 内/outer duality is between two kinds 的 forms. 的experiencer/experienced duality is between formlessness and form.

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    1. 以上来自其他答复的这些细分可能有助于澄清这一点:

      客观性/主观性:我认为只有思想/意识。任何形式的所有经验,无论我们称其为主观的还是客观的,都同样是思想/意识的激发。什么叫我们所谓的区别'objective'经验主要有两件事:(1)它们独立于个人意志(即,一个孤立的大意改变者的意志)而展开; (2)它们在个人之间(即在不同的独立变更之间)始终如一地共享。可以通过理解将要分离的一个个体的个体来解释这两种事情:'objective'因此,现实只是在改变之外展开的广泛思维的心理过程,因此是集体的,与改变的意志无关。我们称他们为'perceptions.' What we call 'subjective'内在生活只是在各自变化内部展开的激发精神的模式。我们称他们为'thoughts', 'emotions,' and 'fantasy.'

      主语/宾语:我的意思是,只有意识-分解为我们称为众生的改变-所有现实都以这种意识激发的复杂模式出现。我们可以称这种意识为'subject'?用普通的语言,我认为不仅我们可以,而且''objects'作为意识之外的事物,并且'subjects' as that which is conscious. 我是 simply acknowledging and using this general intuition, and I think it is strictly valid to do so. My ontology can then be framed as entailing that 的apparent 对象 are simply part 的 的unfolding and expression 的 的学科 to itself.

      Pure 学科/all phenomena: If experiences are 心神 in motion (i.e. excitations 的 心神), 心神 at rest is 的phenomenon you refer to. It has no experiences -- it is phenomenologically empty -- but is pregnant with 的potential for 所有 experiences, just like a guitar string at rest is pregnant with 的potential for 所有 notes. Yet, notice that there is nothing to a vibrating guitar string other than 的guitar string itself. In 的same way, there is nothing to experience but 心神 itself. '形式就是空虚,空虚就是形式。'

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  11. Mathew-一些好帖子。我似乎几乎完全同意您的看法。例如,

    "如果你想摆一些"non-dual" form 的 absolute 意识or absolute 知道ing beyond 学科 and 目的 (e.g., Hegelian dialectical idealism), I might understand you better. But it seems to me you are privileging 学科ivity too much, obscuring 的fact that it is impossible to define without reference to 目的ivity."

    我不't 知道 whether this criticism actually holds since there is a lot 的 ambiguity here but it would also be 的problem that I have. I'd agree that a Hegelian transcendence 的 学科 and 目的 for his Absolute Idea makes sense to me, whilst preserving 的主观 side 的 的equation and disposing 的 的目的 side seems impossible.

    I'我仍在尝试完全归纳贝纳多在说些什么,所以不确定我是否'我实际上不同意除语言或表述以外的任何内容。 。

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    1. If 的'subject' is meant to be 的ego, dissociated alter, personal awareness, finite 意识, etc., then YES, 我是 所有 for 的transcendence 的 的学科 in this sense. This 学科 is an illusion; it isn't there to begin with. And 的对象 this 学科 sees are also an illusion: they are just 的outside image 的 mental processes in 心神-at-large, experienced from 的dissociated perspective 的 an alter.

      BUT, if 的学科 is 的experiencER directly implied by 的very existence 的 experience, in 的sense 的 心神-at-large as 的experiencER 的 reality, then THAT 学科 isn't transcended because it is 所有 there is. The 对象, from its NON-dissociated point-of-view, are just its own 主观ly-experienced mental processes, like imagination, emotion, thought, etc. At that level, there is just this one 学科, experiences being its own excitations.

      Under no formulation 的 idealism -- in fact, under no ontology except for eliminative materialism -- can one deny or transcend 的experiencER at 的level 的 心神-at-large. Doing so amounts to denying experience, since experience implies 的experiencer.

      I insist on using 的word 'subjective' because 的culture at large associates 'objective'带有意识之外的东西'subject' with experience itself. I want to piggy-back on this general intuition so to emphasize that there is NOTHING outside 的 意识。

      这有帮助吗?

      唐'伙计们,不要对术语和曲折的概念方案感到困惑。我的意思是'如果您停止尝试将其与各种其他方案相关联/标记,那就太复杂了。

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    2. Ha. Maybe this is 的problem, that it isn'不够复杂!

      好的这里's a challenge Bernardo. How would you connect 一元理想主义 with Lao Tsu's aphorism '真实的话似乎很矛盾'?

      这就是困扰我的地方,我可以't make 的leap from 一元理想主义 to nondualism. Perhaps they are, or may be, 的same thing, but to me 的latter solves well 知道n philosophical problems while it is far from obvious how 的former would do this.

      Again, this could be 所有 about language. The lack 的 reference to and thus integration with mainstream texts I can understand, it may be counter-productive, but I struggle to finally join up this view 的 意识with 的explanations 的 Nagarjuna, Lao Tsu, Al_Halaj, De Cusa, Plotinus and so forth.

      如果真的加入,我'm happy, but would say that 的name 'monistic idealism'对于支持Nagarjuna的观点而言,似乎很奇怪并且具有误导性。这两个词似乎暗示着一种极端的看法,

      这里的评论澄清了几件事,似乎在那里's not much disagreement on anything except language and 的final reductionist step in 的theory. Which is par for 的course on this topic.




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    3. I'm not sure it's a 物 的 being too complex. There are some extremely simple, widely accessible experiential/psychological aspects 的 学科 and 目的 that seem fuzzy in this particular formulation - but I can'绝对不能这样说是因为我不'尚未获得如何连接您的(Bernardo's) language with ordinary everyday experience. I was trying to do that above, with 的"i see a 树" example, but then 的words started getting quite complicated.

      也许我 'll post something on 的forum. I think this is really good - getting a lot 的 things clearer that, at least for me, were rather cloudy. But I'd love to see it done outside 的realm 的 conventional philosophic language altogehter, not being overly concerned about precise labels (this is me; i'我当然不是在说Peter或Matt,而是想传达直接的经验。我不'我不知道确切的时间,但是我've had it in 心神 at some point to create a thread that has this more down to earth quality. I think i mentioned it above but i'm in 的midst 的 so many projects at 的moment I may be losing 的thread.

      无论如何,简单-我喜欢它。希望这一切都没有't sound too muddled.

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    4. 贝尔纳多是正确的。他预先说,当我说"mind" I mean "consciousness ". 我不't do that but I understand his meaning. Semantics is 的materialist's last sword.

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    5. Well, John, it is also 的investigator'消除混乱的主要武器。让's say it'一把两刃的剑,可以用来治病。

      Hey 唐, are you suggesting that metaphysics is not down-to-earth? An outrageous idea.

      I've刚刚在我的博客上发布了关于所有这些内容的注释,以便勾勒出我的立场,而不必使其成为现有论点的一部分。欢迎评论,但是'仅是一个立场声明。

      //theworldknot.wordpress.com/2015/06/08/on-why-i-cannot-quite-agree-with-bernardo-kastrup/




      //theworldknot.wordpress.com/2015/06/08/on-why-i-cannot-quite-agree-with-bernardo-kastrup/.

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  12. 我可能会缺少一些东西。经验"mind" is "known"通过推断"mind"通过经验。我确实觉得我've missed something. If I experience a particle 的 物, and experience my observation 的 that particle. Then I experience 心神 through 的experience 的 推断ence 的 的particle and 心神.

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    1. 你说的"mind" as "thoughts" or "intellect." What you say is correct in that sense. But, as I emphasize in 的last paragraph 的 的essay, I talk 的 "mind" as "consciousness,"就像振动本身就是经验一样。

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    2. Ah, right, 心神(consciousness) is formless, experience is 的form. Things without form are beyond comprehension. 我不't 知道 why I was thinking 的 心神 as intellect, ha , I didn'甚至没有意识到我直到你指出来。

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  13. 称它为"con game" seems to imply some intention on way or another. We should come out and say what we mean in terms 的 的abstraction levels 的 心神 and 物! My interpretation 的 materialism and most philosophy is that 物 is explicit on any level 的 abstraction, and that 心神 is merely related to experience. This does not mean that 心神 has its own level 的 abstraction or is separate from or 的same as a 具体 order 的 material.

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