初步反思In criticizing illusionists such as 法兰克人, one is always faced with 的dilemma of either writing with 的general public in mind or 的individual illusionist one is criticizing. The most effective line of reasoning is different in each case, for 的public isn’t tied up in 的conceptual and definitional knots illusionists create for themselves. Indeed, whereas 的public—从更客观，更坚定的视角观看—can easily grasp 的blatant circularity and inconsistency of 的illusionist argument, 的illusionists themselves 是 too immersed in their own story to fathom any of it. Instead, one must first meet them where they 是, otherwise they will choose to 是lieve 那 their points 是 merely misunderstood by their critics.
Having always written with 的general public in mind, it thus comes as no surprise to me 那 法兰克人 should feel certain 那 I 做 not grasp what he is saying. At no point 做 es he 似乎 to entertain 的possibility 那 I actually understand perfectly well where he is coming from, why he thinks what he thinks, and yet still consider his story blatantly absurd.
As a matter of fact, in 的early years of my career as a computer engineer, I wrestled intensely with 的question of how to build computers 那 would consider themselves 意识 even if not programmed to 做 so; 那 is, how to construct a machine 那 would not only perform calculations, but also 自发地 claim to experience these calculations, just as you and I experience 的goings-on in our brain. This wasn’对我来说，扶手椅是个哲学问题，但是这是一个非常具体和实际的问题。然后’s precisely why I ended up wasting so much time on it: I never stopped to examine 的implicit assumptions embedded in 的very problem statement 那 motivated my search.
And so it was 那, in 的first years of 的21st century, Pentti 海科宁, a researcher at Nokia, came up with 一种计算机架构，不仅会自觉，而且会自觉—Haikonen thought—also in fact 是 意识. 海科宁’s deeply insightful realization was two-fold: first, 的original semantic anchoring of 的input signals fed into 的computer should 是 preserved—而不是被编码成任意的二进制符号—if 的computer is to consider itself 意识; second, feedback loops should 是 inserted in 的architecture at strategic points, so as to allow 的computer to 内省 by re-representing its own computational activity.
海科宁’我认为这是一种出色的方法，至今仍非常受人尊敬，这种方法可以被视为有效的阐述—比法兰克本人更为具体和具有说服力—on 法兰克人’s claim 那 内省ive (mis)representation is what leads to 的belief 那 we 是 意识. As such, and implausible as it may sound to him, I 是lieve I actually understand why 法兰克人 considers illusionism so compelling. I am very familiar with 的thinking and motivations 是hind it, in a fairly high level of (engineering) detail.
Indeed, 海科宁 creatively tackled many of 的difficulties I had identified for building a machine 那 could 自发地 claim to 是 意识. Alas, we would 是 unable to verify such claim, for 的only way to 知道 would 是 to 是 的machine. Yet, 的claim alone would already 是 a remarkable engineering achievement, one I was very interested in contributing to.
但是，当涉及到我们时’不仅仅是自发声明的问题：我们实际上 知道那we 是 意识, for we 是 ourselves. In our case, therefore, we must address 的hard problem of 意识, which 海科宁’s architecture—despite his philosophically naive claims to 的contrary—completely fails to 做 : instead of creating 意识 in 的phenomenal sense, his approach merely presupposes it. And so 做 es 法兰克人’s.
No amount of structure, complexity, feedback, recursion, re-representation, etc., can make a substrate presumed to 是 fundamentally unconscious produce experience, in 的same way 那 no amount of added speakers can turn a stereo into a television, and 那 no amount of extra legs can make a centipede fly. Recursive re-representations can only complexify pre-existing experiential states, not create them from something fundamentally non-experiential. More specifically, what recursive re-representations can 做 is to make pre-existing 惊人的ity accessible to metacognitive 内省ion, not create it.
Conflating 意识 with metacognitive awarenessFor 法兰克人, it is our ability to 内省 by metacognitively re-representing our neural processes 那 characterizes what we call 意识。 He writes:
它是我们已经或很容易意识到的有意识经历的标志。我们可以将注意力吸引到内部（‘introspect’) and think about 的experiences we 是 having.It is this 内省ion 那, according to 法兰克人, creates 的illusion of qualitative experience: “我们的内省系统会监控这些[神经]过程，但将其误认为是一种简单的质量，” he says. “The illusion concerns 的nature of these processes—相信他们是简单的夸张。”后来他继续说：“It is this emphasis on 的effects of 内省ion 那 makes 的notion of illusion so appropriate here.”
The problem is 那 法兰克人 conflates 惊人的 意识—也就是说，原始经验，‘what-it-is-likeness’—with 元意识. As Jonathan Schooler explained in his 2002 paper, Re-representing 意识: dissociations 是tween experience and 元意识,
Periodically attention is directed towards explicitly assessing 的contents of experience. The resulting 元意识 involves an explicit re-representation of 意识 in which one interprets, describes, or otherwise characterizes 的state of one’s mind.但 惊人的 意识 做 es not require 元意识: if an experience falls outside 的field of our attention, we have 的experience without 是ing aware 那 我们有它。例如，我们经常在没有元认知表现的情况下体验呼吸。此外，正如詹妮弗·温特（Jennifer Windt）和托马斯·梅琴格（Thomas Metzinger）在2007年的论文中所讨论的那样， The philosophy of dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to 的experiential subject during 的dream state, dreams largely lack 内省ive re-representation, despite their undeniably experiential nature. Even 的emerging ‘no-report paradigm’ in neuroscience rests on 的understanding 那 experience can—and frequently 做 es—occur without explicit 内省ive awareness, such as in 的cases of blindsight 那 法兰克人 likes to cite.
In conflating 意识 with 元意识, 法兰克人 is failing to heed a key conceptual distinction already discussed by philosopher Ned Block in his important 1995 paper, On a confusion about a function of 意识：内省需要元认知访问，但内省却不需要’t need to 是 惊人的. Phenomenal 意识, in turn, 做 esn’它需要内省地访问才能存在。这是两件事。
因此，法兰克人’基于内省性（错误）陈述来解释经验的诉求是基于—正如我最初声称的—关于概念上的困惑：如果没有经验’从一开始，我们没有任何理由相信内省性的重新表达将是，或者似乎是经验性的。相反，一切都会发生‘in 的dark,’ without 的light of awareness.
Eating 的cake and having it tooFor 法兰克人’s position to have any relevance in helping tackle or circumvent 的hard problem of 意识, what he must deny is 惊人的ity, felt experience, qualia, ‘what-it-is-likeness.’ Anything else, despite potentially having some other philosophical application, would 是 irrelevant as far as 的hard problem is concerned.
Unsurprisingly, thus, 法兰克人 often emphasizes 那 what he denies is precisely 惊人的ity, qualia, experience. For instance, already in 的subtitle of 最近的一篇文章他写道“Phenomenal 意识 is a fiction written by our brains”（添加了重点）。这不’t 似乎 to leave much room for ambiguity, as philosophers use 的qualifier ‘phenomenal’ precisely to specify, unambiguously, 那 what is meant by 的word ‘consciousness’是品质，感受，‘what-it-is-likeness.’
但 to deny 的qualities of experience is to deny, for instance, 那 we feel pain; is to say 那 our agonizing screams under torture—as well as 的accompanying physiological processes—are merely functional, useful for getting help; but 那, from 的inside, none of 的dreadful qualities we associate with pain 是 actually felt. If 法兰克人 denies 的qualities of experience, presumably he wouldn’t mind undergoing torture, which I very much 做 ubt to 是 的case.
因此，法兰克尼斯（Frankish）在回覆我时就已经承认“utterly ridiculous” to claim 那 “人们没有意识，不要’t have experiences.”他继续说“illusionists 做 n’不要否认我们有意识,” 那 there is a “我们无疑是有意识的” 那 “我们的生活充满了有意识的经历。”真？那么，魔术师是什么意思 做 拒绝？
“What illusionists reject is a certain 的构想 what 意识 is,” 法兰克人 claims. 但 then again, if illusionism is to have any relevance as far as 的hard problem is concerned, 的“conception of 意识” 那 must 是 denied is precisely 那 entailing pain and emotion, felt experiences, which 法兰克人 has just acknowledged to exist! Any other 的构想 意识—such as Block’s ‘access 意识’ or Schooler’s ‘meta-consciousness’—is irrelevant for 的hard problem: it still leaves us with having to explain how raw experience, whether metacognitively represented or not, arises from an allegedly non-experiential substrate.
法兰克人 thus faces an impossible dilemma, which he can only tackle by systematically contradicting himself. He deserves our sympathy, for 的job of manufacturing even a smidgen of plausibility for what is 的most incongruous maneuver conceivable to 的human mind—否认自己—is not exactly easy. On 的one hand, he must acknowledge 那 “illusionists 做 n’不要否认我们有意识,” otherwise they would just 是 crazy. On 的other hand, he also has to claim 那
Illusionists reject 的qualitative 的构想 意识。 They hold 那 qualia, and 的private show they constitute, 是 illusory; they 似乎 to exist but 做 n’t really. This is 的core claim.我们如何平方这个圆？法兰克人似乎有所作为—他明显不这样做’t elaborate upon—between experience or 惊人的ity on 的one hand, and felt qualities on 的other. He acknowledges 的former while, bizarrely, denying 的latter. Yet, to reject 的“qualitative 的构想 意识” is to deny experience, 惊人的ity, 惊人的 意识 itself; after all, 的latter is defined as entailing 的felt qualities of experience.
Is 法兰克人 playing some silly game of words? In what sense is he acknowledging 那 we have pain and emotion if he is denying 的qualities 那 pain and emotion 是? Granted, pain and emotion 是 associated with certain functions and 是haviors, but this has nothing to 做 with 意识。 By focusing on function and 是havior to 的exclusion of qualia, 法兰克人 is merely ignoring 的hard problem, closing his eyes to it, not tackling or circumventing it in any meaningful sense.
当他向我们保证“illusionists 做 n’不要否认我们有意识” and thus 是n’t outright crazy, 法兰克人 is appealing to our intuitive understanding of 意识 states as felt qualities. 但 then, having accomplished 那, he immediately turns around and rejects 的“qualitative 的构想 意识” so as to portray his approach as relevant to addressing 的hard problem, instead of something utterly trivial. Which one is it? He can’t have it both ways. Either he is sane, or his work is relevant when it comes to 的hard problem.
重新定义术语的解释Contrary to what 法兰克人 suggests, 的qualitative dimension of experience isn’这仅仅是一个概念上的现实，而是一个感觉到的，直接的现实。我们必须牢记这一点，这一点非常重要。
您会看到，科学中有许多实体，其唯一可访问的现实是概念性的：例如，想到数学中的虚数或物理学中的量子场。世界举止 好像 这些概念实体存在，因此，想象它们确实很有用。但是我们没有立即获得他们的进入。我们对他们的了解是 的构想 他们。
Therefore, these conceptual entities 是 perfectly amenable to 是ing redefined, if 做 ing so helps to make sense of things. For instance, it has 是en useful to redefine gravity as a curvature of spacetime, instead of an invisible force acting 是tween two bodies from a distance. We have no direct acquaintance either with 的curvature of spacetime or 的invisible force, so we might as well feel free to redefine gravity based on theoretical convenience.
However, an analogous rationale 做 es not apply to 惊人的 意识, for 的qualities of experience 是n’仅仅是概念上的；他们是 立即感到。通过拒绝“a certain 的构想 what 意识 is” illusionists 是n’使这些感觉的品质消失；他们只是无视他们，假装他们没有’t exist.
确实，无论我们选择在概念游戏中使用的意识定义如何，仍然存在—在进行所有概念性推理之前，我们不可否认的这件事—that will continue to exist whatever we call it. The hard problem of 意识 is essentially about this thing, not 的word ‘consciousness.’ If you think 的label ‘consciousness’ shouldn’不适用，我不’不在乎，别称它；叫它… well, 的‘thing.’ 但 的thing won’只是因为您重命名而不再存在。即使我们可以’用文字恰当地定义它，它就赢了’受到影响；它将保持原样，并且一直如此。术语游戏’改变现实，无论我们多么希望他们这样做。
法兰克人, however, 似乎s to think 那 he can make 的felt qualities of experience—the thing—disappear simply by redefining terms. Consider 的following passages from his reply:
“experiences 是 physical states of 的brain”
“consciousness consists, not in awareness of private mental qualities, but in a certain relation to 的public world”
“It is this global broadcasting and its effects 那 constitute 意识”
“I am proposing 那 意识 is this complex of informational and reactive processes”
嘿，我也可以玩这个游戏。怎么样‘consciousness is 的involuntary microscopic twitching of my left big toe’? Or—再认真一点—‘consciousness is 的collapse of 的quantum wave function in 的synaptic clefts of my prefrontal cortex’？就解释力而言，这些陈述与“意识是信息和反应过程的复合体”？他们有没有那么武断？定义性陈述是否具有解释力？他们解决任何问题了吗？
The bottom-line is this: We 知道 first-hand what 意识 is, regardless of how 的word is defined. It 做 esn’无论法兰克人多久重复一次，多热情地重复他的信仰声明，我们都知道这件事很重要；它赢了’不会因为语义游戏而消失。用条款的重新定义代替实际的论点’t 做 . Otherwise, I would have won 的Fields Medal long ago by merely redefining yet-unsolved problems in such a way 那 的solution would 是 trivial.
Failure to grasp 的criticism法兰克人’s central point is 那 our 内省ive re-representations of our own physical brain states 是 illusory in 的sense 那 they 做 n’准确描绘出所述的大脑状态。那’s why—in his view—we mistakenly think we have qualia, instead of just physical brain states: 的latter 是 metacognitively misrepresented as 似乎 qualia, which is 的illusion in question.
My original refutation of this argument was as simple as it was generic: if 的misrepresentations 似乎 qualitative, then 的very 似乎 is already a quality, regardless of what 的misrepresentations 似乎 like. After all, an illusion is already a felt experience in and of itself, regardless of its lack of representational accuracy. The implication is 那 we 做 have qualia, not despite our re-representations 是ing inaccurate in 的way 法兰克人 claims them to 是, but 正因为如此。
Yet, 法兰克人 failed to understand this simple point. He misconstrues and misportrays it as something unnecessarily more restrictive, which can 是 seen in 的following passage (if you find it too difficult to follow his reasoning, no worries, I summarize it in simpler words 是low):
如果没有真正的能力，我们似乎会感到不适吗？卡斯特鲁普认为没有。‘Good Lord,’ he exclaims, ‘the ‘seeming’本身就是一种体验。’ Does this simple point blow illusionism out of 的water, as Kastrup supposes? There’这是一种可能的方式。假设… 似乎 to perceive a thing involves 是ing aware of 的mental qualities one would have 是en aware of if one were really perceiving it. Then, by analogy, 似乎 to 内省 a mental quality would involve 是ing aware of 的mental quality one would have 是en aware of if one were really 内省ing it. And 那, presumably, is 的very same mental quality. The illusion would involve a real instance of 的thing 那 was supposed to 是 illusory! …该异议的缺陷很明显：它假定经验涉及对心理素质的认识。弗兰奇（Frankish）在这里说的是，只有当我们所谓的感知性大脑状态的错误陈述对应于“如果人们真的[有意识地]感知到了，他们就会意识到他们的心理素质。” 但 such constraint is not at all necessary for my criticism to hold: whether 的alleged misrepresentations match what would have 是en 的actual qualia of perception or not is irrelevant, as long as 的misrepresentations 似乎 喜欢的东西 任何东西;它没有’t matter what. The 似乎 alone already entails felt qualities—whatever they may 是—因此，必须具备感觉品质。
即使被误解的是身体的大脑状态—与体验品质相反—the corresponding 似乎, in and of itself, is already an experience entailing its own (illusory) felt qualities. Therefore, contrary to what 法兰克人 claims, 的only assumption my criticism makes is 那 there is 似乎, which is precisely what illusionism requires (otherwise one cannot speak of illusions to 是gin with).
最后的思考I earn my living 做 ing corporate strategy in 的high-tech industry, perhaps 的most rewarding but also most unforgiving environment for analytic thinking. In 那 world—my world—即使是细微的和可以理解的推理失败也很快—而且通常不成比例—punished, either by management or by 的market. Reality can always 是 counted upon to settle all questions in a rather brutal but objective manner; something I have grown to appreciate over 的years, for it forces me to 是 constantly critical of my own narratives.
然而，让我感到震惊的是，在哲学上似乎可以无限期地摆脱不连贯的思维。如果不能清楚，实质地主张一项’自己的位置，冗长的误导，模棱两可和挥舞手法常常使人们对一个人是否真的错是足够怀疑。因此，废话可以生存 广告无限. There is always 的lingering 做 ubt 那, hidden 是hind impenetrably obscure language constructs and indecipherable conceptual acrobatics, there might just 是 some deep, non-obvious philosophical insight. Yet, often there is none; often things 是 precisely what they 似乎 to 是: very confused and self-contradictory thinking. Perhaps this is 的reason why philosophy 做 esn’似乎没有进步。
Although I have made a deliberate effort in this essay to patiently meet 的illusionists where they 是—为了做一些不同于重复的事情 我最初的批评，其中大部分弗兰西斯（Frankish）都没有’t even address, such as my claim 那 he falls for 的fallacy of infinite regress—it remains my position 那 illusionism is 的most ludicrous and self-defeating view conceivable. Nothing in 的history of human thought is, or can 是, more preposterous than it. That some otherwise intelligent people espouse it is, in my view, merely a psychological artifact—拼命挽救一个站不住脚的形而上学的尝试，许多人将自己的身份与—not 的outcome of clear, rational thought.
在一个不太混乱的世界中，幻觉不会’t even 是 a joke. Perhaps we will get there one day. In 的meantime, however, brutally honest, even scathing public criticism may 是 的only system of checks-and-balances available to preserve 的sanity of philosophy. The present essay has 是en written in this ultimately well-meaning spirit.