菲利普·高夫论证的讽刺意味


在过去的几天中,我与泛心理学家菲利普·高夫(Philip Goff)交换了一些文章,互相批评对方的形而上学立场。查看我的最新回复 这里 . Since these exchanges, shorter discussions have taken place on 推特 , some of which made me 真实ize how ironic philosophical discussions can be.

I've met Philip for the first time in Shanghai, in 2017, when he was still an idealist-leaning cosmopsychist, who subscribed 至 the view that there 是 only one cosmic 学科. Since then, he became a constitutive panpsychist who adheres 至 the view that only microscopic particles are conscious, our ordinary 学科ivity being somehow constituted by some kind of combination of microscopic little 科目 in our brain.

正如我所指出的 我的批评 , the notion of 学科组合 是 not only physically incoherent ('particles' are just metaphors for field excitations), but also logically incoherent (there 是 no discernible sense in stating that two 基本的ly private fields of experience can combine 至 form a single derivative one that subsumes the originals).

为了捍卫他的观点,菲利普 反复假设 the possible existence of new, entirely speculative "psycho-physical laws of 性质" 至 try and account for the magic of 学科组合. This basically means that, instead of explaining 学科组合, he simply labels it a brute 事实 of 性质: it just happens; it doesn't need 至 be explained (i.e. reduced 至 something else) because it 是 基本的. Methinks this 是 a copout, but alright.

这里首先要讽刺的是,某个人似乎在推理但将所有问题都推入了归约基础(微观意识,组合定律,任何相关的一切),因此未能提供任何解释,现在控告我未能提供任何解释。嗯,解离的解释。

Let me explain. If you start, as I do, from a universal 学科, you need 至 make sense of how that one 学科 becomes many seemingly separate ones, such as you and me. We call it the '主题分解' problem, and it entails a challenge opposite 至 that of 学科组合. I solve the decomposition problem by appealing 至 the 经验ly-established 分离的精神病现象,仅此而已:一个人的思想似乎分解为许多不同的个性变化。

但 such a powerful appeal 至 an 经验 事实 菲利普还不够。他说我必须 从概念上解释 how, exactly, dissociation unfolds and does what we know it does (i.e. create the appearance of 主题分解). Otherwise, according 至 him, my reference 至 dissociation has no value for defending the notion that there 是 just one universal 学科, of which we are 分离的变化.

让我们来评估一下。我已经提到的第一点讽刺意味:似乎是通过 避免解释 现在要求 概念解释 for an 经验ly-established phenomenon, before he can accept said phenomenon. Make no mistake, reasoning by shoving things into the reduction base not only fails 至 provide any explanation, it seeks 至 永远  抢先需求; it 是 the very 对立 的解释。

现在,具有讽刺意味的第二点是:当哲学家要求对某些假定现象进行明确的概念解释时,这一点 总体而言,对此类需求的评估 合理性 of the phenomenon actually occurring in 性质, as opposed 至 being merely a theoretical invention.

This way, when we demand from physicalists a 概念解释 for how arrangements of matter can give rise 至 consciousness, we want 至 evaluate whether this plausibly happens in 性质 or not. When we demand from constitutive panpsychists an explicit explanation for how 学科组合 takes place, we want 至 judge whether the occurrence of 学科组合 in 性质 是 plausible.

但是如果我们已经指出, 经验ly, 实际发生 在所讨论的现象中,大部分概念解释的价值消失了;因为如果要知道这种现象是否合理,我们已经有了答案。当然,有一个概念上的解释仍然很好,这样我们就可以在思想上封闭,但是合理性和存在性的问题已经解决了。

那里 是 no 经验 demonstration that matter generates consciousness; only that they are correlated. So we need an explicit 概念解释 for this physicalist notion, so as 至 evaluate its 合理性. Alas, there 是 no such explanation. 那里 are only conceptual demonstrations that the phenomenon 是 impossible already in principle.

那里 是 no 经验 demonstration of 学科组合 occurring in 性质 (have you ever met two people who merged 至 gether and became one single mind?). So we need an explicit 概念解释 for this combination, so as 至 evaluate its 合理性. Alas, there 是 no such explanation. 那里 are only conceptual demonstrations that 学科组合 是 an incoherent notion.

there are robust 经验 occurrences of one mind believing itself 至 be many; we call it dissociation. That the corresponding belief 是 an illusion 是 n'也不是问题;相反:幻觉正是我们需要考虑到您和我的事实 相信 至 be different, separate 科目 .

因此,与物理主义和本构泛精神主义不同,它们各自面临着一个无法解决的问题—namely, the hard problem of consciousness and the 学科组合 problem, respectively—分析型唯心主义没有面对任何事情:我们知道 经验ly that 主题分解 occurs. 那里 是 no question about its 合理性, even if there were no conceptual models at all 至 explain how it works.

碰巧的是,实际上 a tentative 概念解释 for 主题分解 based on the notion of inferential 是 olation. Is it sufficient 至 make 完成 sense of dissociation? Probably not, as I suspect a better theory of time 是 required 至 achieve that goal (Bernard Carr, time for you 至 help out 这里 my friend, if you already have something publishable). 但 it 是 certainly already way better than any attempt 至 make conceptual sense of 学科组合.

我的解离概念模型的可争议的不完整性是否在很大程度上损害了分析唯心主义?当然不是。对于我们是否可以使完全解离的概念意义深远, 我们知道它的发生并确实证明了分析唯心主义需要做的事情. The value of the conceptual model would be mainly 至 allow us 至 evaluate the 合理性 of 主题分解 happening. 但是我们已经知道会发生这种情况 是否可以完全概念化它。

那里fore, that Philip acknowledges dissociation as an 经验 事实 but then turns around and says, "在没有解释的情况下(对于解离,凯斯楚普的批评),对泛精神论的批评没有提供这样的解释在我看来似乎没有任何力量“这听起来对我而言非常接近苏菲尔。菲利普正在比较(a)未能提供 完成 一个概念模型 经验ly-established 事实  to (b) the veritable appeal 至 magic entailed by the entirely speculative and arguably incoherent notion of 学科组合. 那里 是 just no basis for comparison 这里 .

The job of philosophers in metaphysics 是 largely 至 provide speculative conceptual models. So I understand Philip's intuitive attachment 至 these speculations. 但 I also see two problems with it: first, the risk of losing 至 uch with 经验 真实ity, which must always come first. We cannot replace 真实ity with speculative conceptual models and live just in our heads. Or perhaps we can, but it certainly wouldn't help us achieve anything useful.

Second, if exaggerated emphasis 是 nonetheless placed on conceptual models over 经验 真实ity, then one should at least be 一致的 如此特殊的选择:Philip不能要求任何 当我本人(他自己)不但没有提供这样的模型,而是将相关的问题推入减少的基础时,就仿佛代表了进步一样。如果您正在谈论谈话,请步行。

The bottom line 是 this: while Philip 是 busy adding consciousness and wholly-speculative "psycho-physical laws" of 学科组合 至 the reduction base of physicalism, and thereby providing not even partial explanations for anything, I am busy leveraging an 经验ly-established phenomenon 至 substantiate my views, as well as providing at least partial conceptual models for how it works.

我对菲利普的立场和论点失去了很多理智的尊重。因此,我没有动力继续与他订婚。但是,由于我已经在夏季晚些时候在播客中承诺进行辩论,因此我将继续进行下去。

具有讽刺意味的是,在这场辩论中可能会出现新的事物的唯一希望是,菲利普(Philip) 对我的最新回应, 是 giving multiple signs that he may, after all, return 至 the notion of one cosmic 学科 (plus some postulates of new 基本的 laws of 性质). Since he was a cosmopsychist just a couple of years ago, then a constitutive panpsychist for the duration of one book, and now seemingly something else already again, who knows what his position will be by the time we debate?


PS: Some readers are getting confused with the terminology. 那里 是 no 学科组合 at the end of dissociation under analytic idealism, because there was only one 学科 all along (the multiplicity of 科目 是 illusory). What happens at the end of dissociation 是 merely the end of an illusion, not a combination of 科目 . When you wake up from a dream, or a DID patient 是 cured, no 科目 combine because everything was going on in only one 真正 学科 至 begin with. We only talk of combination when supposedly  真正,  基本的 微观主体据称构成非基本的宏观主体,如构成性泛精神论中的那样。
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45条评论:

  1. 我将其总结为:

    如果没有任何证据,也没有关于如何实现的概念,那么您’不在一个好地方(唯物主义);

    If there 是 a conception of how something might be possible, then that 是 a good reason 至 look for 经验 evidence - but you might not find it as conception doesn’t entail 经验 真实ity (panpsychism);

    If you have 经验 evidence for something then that 是 the best possible reason 至 work on a formulation of how that 是 possible if we want 至 fully understand it - conception adds 至 our understanding of what 是 already the case 经验ly (idealism).

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  2. “您有没有遇到两个人融合在一起成为一个人的想法?”

    如果可能发生思维分解,那么结合也会发生。我倾向于认为这是同一枚硬币的两个方面。

    我怀疑两个人(例如,配偶)相距足够近(在时空中进行了许多密集的相互交往),当他们聚集时可能会成为主题。例如,他们共享共同的记忆;说,当丈夫忘记时,妻子提醒他。我相信这个’这就是为什么,一个人的死亡对另一个人来说是无法承受的,因为他/她失去了他们组成的头脑。

    或考虑一些连体的连体双胞胎,尽管他们有两个独立的大脑,但它们可以一起骑自行车–他们就像拥有1。

    我最近看过你的文字,但还没看过’s;所以他在这个问题上的观点可能与我在这里试图说的不完全一致。

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    1. 的概念'subject combination' and '主题分解'在哲学上有正式的定义,我根据这样的定义使用它们。这些定义与您所说的内容无关。学科组合被正式定义为两个基本微观学科以某种方式形成更高层次的学科。这不'因为离解的受试者没有'从根本上来说,只是虚幻的。为了避免这种混淆,我在这篇文章中添加了此后记:
      在分析理想主义下,解离结束时没有主题组合,因为一直只有一个主题(主题的多重性是虚幻的)。解离结束时发生的只是幻想的结束,而不是主体的组合。当您从梦中醒来或DID患者治愈后,没有任何对象会合并,因为一切始于一个真正的对象。我们仅在假设是真实的情况下谈论结合,据称基本的微观主体据称构成了非基本的宏观主体,如构成性泛精神论那样。

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    2. 谢谢。现在我明白了您的意思以及您与Goff的区别'对此帐户的立场。

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    3. 一段时间过去了,感谢您与Goff的讨论,我对此进行了重新思考。

      My main concern 是 on your definition of 基本的 and your 经验 support.

      我现在想,连体双胞胎的例子’上面给出的d确实可以满足您的要求。 (还请注意,最近大量的社会神经科学研究显示出一种新的“subject”与正常人的互动。)

      在这些情况下:2“subjects” and (tens of participant in other studies) cooperate and behave as if they are 1 学科. Crucially in neural level, their brains couple and behave as if they are one emergent sole network. If we assume 至 p down approach of yours, then the 基本的 学科 should be the one that emerges with the cooperation of these twins. However, intuitively, the 基本的 one 是 the persons and the constructed one 是 due 至 interaction of them.

      我想知道是什么让您认为DID患者应该被视为“fundamental” and why “dissociated alters” are not 基本的 but illusory? Hence, I am not sure the 经验 case of DID clearly supports decomposition rather than combination. As social neuroscience “empirical” cases 是 in conflict with that as long as you assume a person 至 be a necessarily 基本的; and in the end, it seems 至 me neither direction (from-One-to-multiple OR from-multiple-to-one) 是 “empirically” supported.

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  3. I’我试图将此与我自己联系起来,作为一个虚幻的独立主题。当然,有些像是我的事情。作为单独的主题,我所有的经历对我来说都是真实的(毕竟,非真实的经历是矛盾的)。但是,它 ’完全有可能甚至有可能是,相对于“absolute”现实(例如椅子的外观牢固度)。问题:您是否认为虚幻的独立主题体验是“real”在我所描述的意义上?如果是这样,将含义赋予虚幻的存在是否存在任何固有的问题/困难?

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    1. Surely illusions are 真实 _as experiences_. 那里 是 something it feels like 至 have an illusion, so it 是 真实 as that experience. As for meaning, yes, it 是 preserved, for illusions tell a whole lot about the mind that conjures them up.

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    2. 贝尔纳多:“使他们联想起的头脑。”

      那里’在那里掠夺了很多东西。我认为精神魔术既是一个思想的活动,也是许多衍生的虚幻的独立思想的活动,这可能与@psychedral有关’的Twitter响应中提到的层的概念。

      I’m obviously an amateur 这里 , so feel free 至 brush me off with a few pertinent articles/references, but mental conjuring begs many many questions regarding the underlying 性质 of mind/thought. What 是 known and/or conjectured about the origins or 性质 of mental activity? Is there volition in this activity? Self-aware at any level?

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  4. 你读过安东尼·皮克(Anthony Peake)的书吗?

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  5. 可以为某种情况"soft combination," not necessarily 基本的 since ultimately there 是 one 学科, but effectively a kind of recombination of alters into a higher-order unity? I'我在这里具体思考从单细胞生物到多细胞生物的进化过渡,在此过程中(如果我们将意识归因于这一水平的存在),从较小的成分中出现了一种统一的意识?

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    1. 那里 是 a lot of discussion about this in the literature. In a well-known 2014, Sam Coleman argues that 学科组合 是 even incoherent altogether. His argument 是 compelling, and I side with him on this. I think cells are like subatomic particles: 'pixels'感知的屏幕,代表的产物而不是主观性的结构。

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  6. 嗨,贝尔纳多,我有一个疑问,关于您如何将三摩地的成就整合到您的哲学中,或者就此而言,叔本华's.

    我认为,通过冥想练习可以实现三摩地(samādhi)状态-一种没有主观/客体二元性的未分化思想的幸福状态。一旦三摩地的状态降到自然极限,您便会回到普通的二元性和令人不满意的存在状态。现在,假设您同意这样的萨摩地状态是可能的,'不了解您如何在理想模型中考虑它们。

    在我看来,根据您的理想主义哲学,"离解边界" metaphor, there would be no mechanism by which you would return 至 an ordinary state of existence after a samādhi experience. In other words, I cannot see how in your philosophy there 是 any difference between death - when presumably, perhaps given certain conditions, the 离解边界 是 永远 transcended - and the attainment of samādhi in this life. And if there 是 no difference, then in neither case would you expect 至 return 至 a normal state.

    您的哲学是否令人满意地说明了三摩的可能性?

    谢谢。

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  7. 不会’t attaining a undifferentiated state as you describe it by a matter of temporarily (through some mechanisms/processes) dissolving the 学科’分离的边界?

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    1. 纠正一些错别字:’t attaining an undifferentiated state as you describe be a matter of temporarily dissolving the 学科’s 离解边界 through mental mechanisms/processes?

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    2. Right. 但 what then re-establishes the 离解边界? In a mind-only paradigm there 是 no obvious reason, so far as I can see, why the dissolution of the 离解边界 would be reversed. In other words, you would need a mechanism 至 restore it. That something might be certain material phenomena that in some way are still associated with the mind in samādhi. These material phenomena would draw the mind back once it emerges from samādhi. It 是 not clear, however, what that mechanism would be in a mind only world.
      我并不是要暗示贝尔纳多’s philosophy 是 wrong. My point 是 merely that any valid philosophy must account for all 经验 事实 s.

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    3. 为什么不't the same mechanisms (forces?) that established the 离解边界 initially also work 至 restore it once (temporarily/artificially) dissolved via deep meditative methods?

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    4. Once the dissociated personality merges with the mind at large, there would be nothing 至 go back 至 . 那里 might be further dissociations, but they would not exist in any continuity with the previous one.

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    5. 我的回忆"Idea,"这是因为该模型尚未得到足够详细的开发,无法确定地解决因深沉沉思状态而完全(很大程度上?)解散的边界是否可以(很大程度上)完全的连续性恢复。实际上,Kastrup'与Goff(此博客的根源)的辩论失败了b / c Goff坚持认为Kastrup必须具有一个概念框架,以解释首先如何形成独立的主题(即分离边界)。 Kastrup引用了绝大多数关于DID的经验证据,认为概念框架会很不错,但对于他的模型当然不是关键的。因此,如果对导致初次解离的机制/过程没有概念上的理解,我们为什么会假定通过心理冥想而消解的既定解离将是“矮胖子”(即无法重新就像秋天之前一样组装)。一世'我想像着那种深deep状态实际上是拉开了分裂的帷幕,允许中介者's的独立性,以化为一体,但是当冥想者从the中撤出(通过任何机制/过程)时,窗帘再次关闭,并且分离度与以前相当。当然,这就是我的全部想象力'我们相信该模型在概念上已得到充分开发,可以对此进行详细解释。也许在那里'无需根据确证三摩地确实发生的经验证据-许多认真的禅修者已经报告了这种经历,因此很明显它确实在"nature"...even if we can'描述潜在的过程/机制。

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    6. 您概述的过程和精神活性化学品的作用有何不同?死亡是一个非常正确的过程,您是对的,是跨越一个人无法返回的界限的过程。

      任何形式的冥想和某些物质对个人的影响都不是死亡,而是暂时的状态,这就是为什么Kastrup将此称为边界的削弱。我有他的有声读物'Idea of the World'标题,对此进行了非常严格的解释。

      因此,好消息是,无论您的冥想有多强大或多么深刻,从定义上讲它都不是死亡。因此,您仍然可以同时拥有两者。

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    7. ew,介意引用本章(和本节,如果可能的话)来解释死亡与通过调解和毒品解散的暂时状态之间的区别吗?一世’d非常有兴趣重新访问该主题。非常感谢,大卫

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    8. 嗨,大卫,所以我的原始评论实际上是对
      阿赞'关于samādhi的最初评论,但我认为以审核后上传我的评论的方式看来,我在回应您-

      但是我很高兴分享'第四部分,第12章:精神状态的神经影像学告诉了我们关于世界观念中的身心问题的信息……正如我说的,我有有声读物,但我没有't see why it wouldn'不能在实体副本或电子书中的同一位置。

      同样,在本书第一章的通过中,卡斯特鲁普似乎对药物及其对大脑活动的影响以及对我们对先验经验而非冥想的理解的影响有了更大的区分。've指引您前往。

      如果您要更直接地回答您的问题'd希望将他的想法更简洁地概括为我'd实际上建议了几年前他在自己的网站上发布的帖子,标题是'意识与记忆'.

      我不't know if you've read it but I'd look there first for the Kastrup take on this for both yourself and 阿赞 actually.
      保持健康!

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  8. 贝尔纳多,我很佩服您的耐心。一世'我已经进行了一段时间的讨论,并且比起菲利普,您觉得在寻求真相的辩论上有更多的兴趣和精力。自从我发现你和你的形而上学以来't found any more convincing experience-based one about the 性质 of 真实ity. Yes, there are some areas that still lack some 概念解释 like dissociation but the experience 是 there regardless we can find a model for it or not. More relevant questions for me relate 至 the behaviour and powers of mind at large, how close or far 是 mind-at-large from the omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, and what's mind at large's will and what'与上帝的关系'是无条件的爱,如果它们是同一件事的隐喻。老实说,我对盲目意志的想法比与分离的想法要挣扎得多,并且无疑是一个更有趣的想法(至少对我而言)。例如,解体与自由会并存吗,解体是大盲人或无条件爱上帝的盲目意志的最终表达?一世'希望看到围绕这些更困难的问题进行更多的辩论。

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  9. Hi Bernardo, I have just listened 至 your interview with Jeffrey Mishlove in which you seem sympathetic 至 the 真实ity of certain para-psychological phenomena such as micro-pk. My question 是 : (a) how well do you think your metaphysical position supports reports of exceptional macro pk such as those from individuals like, DD 家 and St. Joseph of Copertino for example, who seem able 至 control "objective 真实ity"通过个人意志或思想在某种程度上,并且(b)您将来会更详细地研究与形而上学有关的超心理学现象吗?谢谢。

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  10. 如果某些超个人状态处于阻塞状态,那么超人状态如何直接影响我的内生状态,从而干扰并阻止其他状态的发生。 (例如:我的思维激发到了MAL的现有状态,从而阻止了其他超个人状态直接干扰我的改变的能力)具体答案

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  11. 好吧,机器人是不可分割的头脑,还是我们在经验世界中找不到的东西?

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  12. I'm a fan of Goff's. I think he's a 真实ly bright guy who's willing 至 change his mind and who has a 真实ly bright future as a philosopher. He'也是认真对待“难题”的有说服力的发言人和出色的传播者。

    但是有时候,关于某些非常具体的问题,他似乎莫名其妙地变得迟钝。这绝对是那些时代之一...

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  13. OP中的Bernardo:"因此,与物理主义和本构泛精神主义不同,它们各自面临着一个无法解决的问题—namely, the hard problem of consciousness and the 学科组合 problem, respectively, 分析型唯心主义没有面对任何事情:我们知道 经验ly that 主题分解 occurs."

    We know 经验ly that people *believe* they are separate, bodily delimited 科目 and that, as you point out, disassociation occurs in certain sorts of brain-based psychopathology. Do we have any 经验 evidence for the existence of the one 学科 of analytic idealism which we are under the illusion of being separate from, I wonder?

    Saw your online debate with Crane and Blackmore, and agree that panpsychism 是 a non-starter and that physicalism hasn't cracked the hard problem. I've got a paper in JCS that you might find of interest since we have at least that much in common, //naturalism.org/sites/naturalism.org/files/Locating%20Consciousness_0.pdf

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  14. 因此,从某种意义上讲,我们所具有的整体意识是妄想碎片,类似于康德式的不可知"thing in itself"? And we can speculate wildly that the meaning and drive of 真实ity 是 that "thing in itself"通过解除联系而意识到?

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  15. 伯纳多写道:

    "There 是 no 经验 demonstration of 学科组合 occurring in 性质 (have you ever met two people who merged 至 gether and became one single mind?)."

    We know from experiments with split-brain individuals that different minds exist in each hemisphere of the brain. However, when the corpus callosum 是 intact, we 学科ively experience one mind.

    这是否构成对贝纳多的驳斥'断言和结合证据?

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    1. 如果有的话,它表明您可以将原始的一个思维分解为两个...

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  16. 我听了争论,对我而言,贝尔纳多'的论点似乎成立了。但是,您似乎将思想和意识互换使用,我的理解正确吗?

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    1. 您是否同意东方传统最常将思想视为比意识更为有限。思维被认为是思想,感觉,感觉和感知的集合,这些思想,感觉,感觉和感知是在意识中出现,出现和发展的,这些意识永远存在,不变,不变。等等。思想的对象是海洋中的洋流,漩涡,波浪,但它们不是海洋本身。

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  17. "There 是 no 经验 demonstration of 学科组合 occurring in 性质 (have you ever met two people who merged 至 gether and became one single mind?). "

    当研究studying体被切断的个体时,科学家在大脑的每个半球中发现不同的想法怎么办?然而,当半球之间的联系完好无损时,我们就会意识到一个人的想法。这是组合的例子吗?

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    1. 陪审团仍未就此达成共识,但如果分裂确实导致两种思想,首先只有一种思想,那么这显然是the体被切断而不是合并时发生的一个分解实例。

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    2. I'我要说的是,如果大脑的两个半球的思维方式不同,那么当它们与call体连接并且感知到一个思维方式时,这就是结合的一个实例。

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  18. 但 there are robust 经验 occurrences of brains generating minds; we call it withdrawing anesthetics. That the corresponding belief in minds without brains 是 an illusion 是 n'也不是问题;相反:幻觉正是我们需要考虑到您和我的事实 相信 我们与大脑分开。

    因此,与理想主义和分解宇宙心理学不同,它们各自面临着一个无法解决的问题—也就是说,假装是't 真实 and the 主题分解 problem, respectively—分析物理主义没有面对任何事情:我们知道 经验ly that brains generate minds. 那里 是 no question about its 合理性, even if there were no conceptual models at all 至 explain how it works. 我们已经知道它发生了,无论我们能否完全概念化它。

    看看我在那里做什么?我转过头来问你这个问题。

    顺便说一句,也许您应该问精神科医生,是否解离=分解。它's an 经验 matter for psychologists, right, so who better 至 ask?

    可怜的是,当您认为某人与您有所不同时,您会失去对某人的尊重。也许这样的人会时不时地改变观点,以避免一直束缚于理论上的发明。

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  19. 不是特别。比将一系列断言串联在一起更聪明。

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