在过去的几天中，我与泛心理学家菲利普·高夫（Philip Goff）交换了一些文章，互相批评对方的形而上学立场。查看我的最新回复 这里 . Since these exchanges, shorter discussions have taken place on 推特 , some of which made me 真实ize how ironic philosophical discussions can be.
I've met Philip for the first time in Shanghai, in 2017, when he was still an idealist-leaning cosmopsychist, who subscribed 至 the view that there 是 only one cosmic 学科. Since then, he became a constitutive panpsychist who adheres 至 the view that only microscopic particles are conscious, our ordinary 学科ivity being somehow constituted by some kind of combination of microscopic little 科目 in our brain.
正如我所指出的 我的批评 , the notion of 学科组合 是 not only physically incoherent ('particles' are just metaphors for field excitations), but also logically incoherent (there 是 no discernible sense in stating that two 基本的ly private fields of experience can combine 至 form a single derivative one that subsumes the originals).
为了捍卫他的观点，菲利普 反复假设 the possible existence of new, entirely speculative "psycho-physical laws of 性质" 至 try and account for the magic of 学科组合. This basically means that, instead of explaining 学科组合, he simply labels it a brute 事实 of 性质: it just happens; it doesn't need 至 be explained (i.e. reduced 至 something else) because it 是 基本的. Methinks this 是 a copout, but alright.
Let me explain. If you start, as I do, from a universal 学科, you need 至 make sense of how that one 学科 becomes many seemingly separate ones, such as you and me. We call it the '主题分解' problem, and it entails a challenge opposite 至 that of 学科组合. I solve the decomposition problem by appealing 至 the 经验ly-established 分离的精神病现象，仅此而已：一个人的思想似乎分解为许多不同的个性变化。
但 such a powerful appeal 至 an 经验 事实 菲利普还不够。他说我必须 从概念上解释 how, exactly, dissociation unfolds and does what we know it does (i.e. create the appearance of 主题分解). Otherwise, according 至 him, my reference 至 dissociation has no value for defending the notion that there 是 just one universal 学科, of which we are 分离的变化.
让我们来评估一下。我已经提到的第一点讽刺意味：似乎是通过 避免解释 现在要求 概念解释 for an 经验ly-established phenomenon, before he can accept said phenomenon. Make no mistake, reasoning by shoving things into the reduction base not only fails 至 provide any explanation, it seeks 至 永远 抢先需求； it 是 the very 对立 的解释。
现在，具有讽刺意味的第二点是：当哲学家要求对某些假定现象进行明确的概念解释时，这一点 总体而言，对此类需求的评估 合理性 of the phenomenon actually occurring in 性质, as opposed 至 being merely a theoretical invention.
This way, when we demand from physicalists a 概念解释 for how arrangements of matter can give rise 至 consciousness, we want 至 evaluate whether this plausibly happens in 性质 or not. When we demand from constitutive panpsychists an explicit explanation for how 学科组合 takes place, we want 至 judge whether the occurrence of 学科组合 in 性质 是 plausible.
但是如果我们已经指出， 经验ly, 至 实际发生 在所讨论的现象中，大部分概念解释的价值消失了；因为如果要知道这种现象是否合理，我们已经有了答案。当然，有一个概念上的解释仍然很好，这样我们就可以在思想上封闭，但是合理性和存在性的问题已经解决了。
那里 是 no 经验 demonstration that matter generates consciousness; only that they are correlated. So we need an explicit 概念解释 for this physicalist notion, so as 至 evaluate its 合理性. Alas, there 是 no such explanation. 那里 are only conceptual demonstrations that the phenomenon 是 impossible already in principle.
那里 是 no 经验 demonstration of 学科组合 occurring in 性质 (have you ever met two people who merged 至 gether and became one single mind?). So we need an explicit 概念解释 for this combination, so as 至 evaluate its 合理性. Alas, there 是 no such explanation. 那里 are only conceptual demonstrations that 学科组合 是 an incoherent notion.
但 there are robust 经验 occurrences of one mind believing itself 至 be many; we call it dissociation. That the corresponding belief 是 an illusion 是 n'也不是问题；相反：幻觉正是我们需要考虑到您和我的事实 相信 至 be different, separate 科目 .
因此，与物理主义和本构泛精神主义不同，它们各自面临着一个无法解决的问题—namely, the hard problem of consciousness and the 学科组合 problem, respectively—分析型唯心主义没有面对任何事情：我们知道 经验ly that 主题分解 occurs. 那里 是 no question about its 合理性, even if there were no conceptual models at all 至 explain how it works.
碰巧的是，实际上 是 a tentative 概念解释 for 主题分解 based on the notion of inferential 是 olation. Is it sufficient 至 make 完成 sense of dissociation? Probably not, as I suspect a better theory of time 是 required 至 achieve that goal (Bernard Carr, time for you 至 help out 这里 my friend, if you already have something publishable). 但 it 是 certainly already way better than any attempt 至 make conceptual sense of 学科组合.
我的解离概念模型的可争议的不完整性是否在很大程度上损害了分析唯心主义？当然不是。对于我们是否可以使完全解离的概念意义深远， 我们知道它的发生并确实证明了分析唯心主义需要做的事情. The value of the conceptual model would be mainly 至 allow us 至 evaluate the 合理性 of 主题分解 happening. 但是我们已经知道会发生这种情况 是否可以完全概念化它。
那里fore, that Philip acknowledges dissociation as an 经验 事实 but then turns around and says, "在没有解释的情况下（对于解离，凯斯楚普的批评），对泛精神论的批评没有提供这样的解释在我看来似乎没有任何力量“这听起来对我而言非常接近苏菲尔。菲利普正在比较（a）未能提供 完成 一个概念模型 经验ly-established 事实 to (b) the veritable appeal 至 magic entailed by the entirely speculative and arguably incoherent notion of 学科组合. 那里 是 just no basis for comparison 这里 .
The job of philosophers in metaphysics 是 largely 至 provide speculative conceptual models. So I understand Philip's intuitive attachment 至 these speculations. 但 I also see two problems with it: first, the risk of losing 至 uch with 经验 真实ity, which must always come first. We cannot replace 真实ity with speculative conceptual models and live just in our heads. Or perhaps we can, but it certainly wouldn't help us achieve anything useful.
Second, if exaggerated emphasis 是 nonetheless placed on conceptual models over 经验 真实ity, then one should at least be 一致的 如此特殊的选择：Philip不能要求任何 当我本人（他自己）不但没有提供这样的模型，而是将相关的问题推入减少的基础时，就仿佛代表了进步一样。如果您正在谈论谈话，请步行。
The bottom line 是 this: while Philip 是 busy adding consciousness and wholly-speculative "psycho-physical laws" of 学科组合 至 the reduction base of physicalism, and thereby providing not even partial explanations for anything, I am busy leveraging an 经验ly-established phenomenon 至 substantiate my views, as well as providing at least partial conceptual models for how it works.
具有讽刺意味的是，在这场辩论中可能会出现新的事物的唯一希望是，菲利普（Philip） 对我的最新回应, 是 giving multiple signs that he may, after all, return 至 the notion of one cosmic 学科 (plus some postulates of new 基本的 laws of 性质). Since he was a cosmopsychist just a couple of years ago, then a constitutive panpsychist for the duration of one book, and now seemingly something else already again, who knows what his position will be by the time we debate?
PS: Some readers are getting confused with the terminology. 那里 是 no 学科组合 at the end of dissociation under analytic idealism, because there was only one 学科 all along (the multiplicity of 科目 是 illusory). What happens at the end of dissociation 是 merely the end of an illusion, not a combination of 科目 . When you wake up from a dream, or a DID patient 是 cured, no 科目 combine because everything was going on in only one 真正 学科 至 begin with. We only talk of combination when supposedly 真正， 基本的 微观主体据称构成非基本的宏观主体，如构成性泛精神论中的那样。